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Deciding to use lethal force with a firearm is a critical decision that has major
implications within society. In order to investigate racial bias in shooting decisions, the current
dissertation uses the First-Person Shooter Task (FPST). Previous literature has shown that
shooting decisions in this task are made faster and more often towards Black targets when
compared to White targets. The relationship between this shooting bias and individual
differences in cognitive ability is explored. The FPST was presented in three different
conditions, each with trial proportions that varied in level of stereotype congruency (i.e., trials
that are congruent with racial stereotypes). A Baseline condition presented an even distribution
of Black Armed, Black Unarmed, White Armed, and White unarmed targets. A Mostly
Congruent condition presented most (80%) of the Black targets as armed and most (80%) of the
White targets as unarmed. A Mostly Incongruent condition presented most of the Black targets
as unarmed and the White targets as mostly armed. Working memory, theoretically represented
as a system of three separate components, was related to shooting behavior in these FPST
conditions. The attentional control component of working memory was shown to be more related
to shooting bias when compared to the capacity-related components, especially in the Mostly
ii

Incongruent condition (where most trials required making shooting decisions that go against
racial stereotype). Study 2 used Confirmatory Factor Analysis to test whether attentional control
ability was separate from proactive and reactive control strategy usage. Results showed that the
attentional control ability was independent from which attentional control strategy was used.
Finally, relating attentional control ability and attentional control strategies to shooting behavior,
results showed that people with high attentional control and high proactive control usage were
more likely to correctly adjust their expectations of threat in the Mostly Incongruent condition
when compared to people with lower ability. People with low attentional control and high
proactive control usage were more likely to adjust their expectations of threat based on racial
stereotypes. Overall, these findings provide new insight into how cognitive ability interacts with
shooting decisions in order to produce racial shooting bias.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
With the recent rise of the media covering the shootings of unarmed Black males, many
researchers have tried to understand why these unfortunate events occur. A popular method of
experimentally investigating biased shooting behavior is the first-person-shooter task (FPST;
Correll et al., 2007). This computer simulation requires participants to decide quickly whether to
“shoot” armed people and “don’t shoot” unarmed people. Results of the FPST typically show
faster, more accurate performance for stereotype-congruent trials (i.e., black armed and white
unarmed) when compared to stereotype-incongruent trials (i.e., black unarmed and white armed;
Correll et al., 2002; Mekawi & Bresin, 2015). An abundance of social factors has been
demonstrated to affect these biased responses on the shooter task, such as stereotype bias
(Correll et al., 2007), emotional state (Kleider et al., 2010), or racial identity (Chaio et al., 2006).
In addition to social factors, cognitive ability factors could also play a role in this shooting bias.
However, research investigating the impact of individual differences on the underlying cognitive
factors of this bias has not been as heavily explored. It is important to explore these individual
differences in cognitive ability because they may be a critical component of the shooting bias
found in the FPST.
To understand the mechanisms that influence shooter bias, it is important to first
conceptualize the nature of the bias. The shooting bias is thought to be a reflection of stereotype
bias that disproportionately associates Black people with danger (Correll et al., 2007; Correll et
1

al., 2015). Because encountering a stereotype concept automatically activates concepts related to
the stereotype (Dovidio et al., 1997), interference is experienced for responses that are not
consistent with the stereotype. For example, if encountering a Black target activates threatrelated ideas, making a non-threat related decision (i.e., “don’t shoot” for unarmed trials) should
be harder than making a threat-related decision (i.e., “shoot” for armed trials).
If the influence of stereotypical information is the main driver of biased shooting, then
mitigating the amount of attention directed towards this race information should result in a
decrease in bias. Critically, successful performance in the FPST does not require attention to race
information; instead, the identity of the object being held is the only relevant information needed.
Thus, unbiased performance relies on the extent to which a person can attenuate the irrelevant
race information and focus on the relevant object information. This dissertation uses a dual
mechanisms approach to attention control (Braver, 2012) in order to conceptualize how this
information attenuation process can be achieved.
The dual mechanisms approach states that attentional control can be divided into
proactive control and reactive control strategies (Braver, 2012). Proactive control is pre-stimulus
rehearsal of the goal for how to direct attention, and reactive control is a strategy to mobilize
attentional control resources only as needed to prevent an error from being made. Proactive
control is generally more effective at mitigating the effects of unwanted information than the
stimulus-driven, reactive control strategy. However, the benefits of proactive control come at a
cost, as it is more difficult to engage and is more reliant on working memory when compared to
reactive control (Doebel et al., 2017; Wiemers & Redick, 2018; Chevalier et al., 2015).
Previous research involving the Stroop task can be informative in examining how these
attentional control strategies can mitigate the effects of irrelevant task information. The Stroop
2

task requires participants to report the font color of color words (Stroop, 1935). Words can be
congruent (the word and font color match) or incongruent (the word and font color are different).
The Stroop literature is informative because efficient performance on the task requires
participants to focus on relevant stimulus information while attenuating irrelevant stimulus
information. By presenting blocks of Stroop trials that were mostly incongruent, and thus
shifting participants to a more proactive strategy, Bugg (2014) showed a decrease in the Stroop
effect (congruent response time - incongruent response time) when compared to both a baseline
condition and a reactive-shift condition. The manipulation was thought to increase proactive
control because the majority of the trials required participants to resolve a word-color conflict,
increasing overall use of top-down attentional control.
Similar to the Stroop task, efficient performance in the FPST also requires a focus on
relevant stimulus information (object identity) while attenuating irrelevant stimulus information
(target race). Given the similarities between the requirements for successful performance
between the Stroop and FPST, the results of Bugg (2014) suggest that proactive control should
be effective at attenuating shooter bias. To this end, the manipulations used in Bugg (2014) can
be used in the FPST. Presenting blocks of FPST trials in which most of the trials are stereotype
incongruent, requiring more attentional control, should shift a participant to adopt a more
proactive strategy. Given the benefits of proactive control, these blocks should show less
shooting bias when compared to a baseline block (50% incongruent) and a mostly congruent
block (20% incongruent).
In addition to examining the relationship between attentional strategies and shooting bias,
the studies in this dissertation were designed to examine how individual differences in cognitive
ability play a role in shooting behavior. Previous research has shown that increased working
3

memory ability is associated with higher usage of proactive control (Weimers & Redick, 2018), a
reduction in overall aggressive shooting behavior (Brewer et al., 2016), and a reduction in
racially biased shooting behavior (Ito et al., 2015). However, these previous studies did not
differentiate among the three components of working memory. The three-component theory of
working memory (Unsworth, 2016) states that working memory is composed of three separate
processes—working memory capacity, secondary memory access, and attentional control—that
can differentially relate to other factors. Thus, these different working memory components
could interact differently with (1) the ability to use proactive and reactive control and (2) the
ability to attenuate shooting bias. For example, given its particularly strong relationship with
response inhibition and sustained focus (Unsworth, 2016), the attentional control component
may be more related to utilizing proactive control to mitigate shooting bias than the capacity and
access components.
Taken altogether, the aims of this dissertation are to: (1) examine the effectiveness of
reactive control versus proactive control in mitigating shooting bias, (2) examine the relationship
between working memory and the ability to use these attentional control strategies, (3) examine
the extent to which proactive/reactive control can be used as an individual difference measure
that is predictive across multiple tasks, and (4) examine the relationship between the working
memory, attentional control, and shooting bias. Study 1 focuses on the three components of
working memory and how they relate to shooting decisions made during situations design to
encourage use of proactive and reactive control strategies. Study 2 focuses on the attentional
control component of working memory and how that relates to proactive/reactive control.
Additionally, Study 2 examines how both attentional control and proactive/reactive control
measures relate to racial bias in shooting decisions.
4

Overview of Dissertation
In order to accomplish these goals, a number of concepts must first be further explored.
First, an overview of the FPST literature is presented. Once the task and its typical findings are
reviewed, a detailed exploration into the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the FPST is
provided. The concept of “stereotype” is defined, and its effect on shooting decisions is explored.
Next, an explanation of how a decision is made within a forced-choice decision task such as the
shooter paradigm is reviewed. After that, a dual-mechanism of control (DMC) framework
(Braver, 2012) highlighting proactive and reactive control is used to explain how the processes
within the diffusion model might be affected by individual differences in proactive control.
Study 1 will then be presented showing the viability of influencing bias by manipulating the
proportion of stereotype congruent trials. Furthermore, Study 1 shows that attentional control is
the most important of the three working memory components in relation to shooting bias.
Finally, Study 2 shows that proactive/reactive control and attentional control ability are separate
constructs that have independent relationships to shooting bias.

5

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
FPST Paradigm
The FPST presents participants with various photographs of natural scenes. A single
person (target), either armed or unarmed, is superimposed over each scene. The participant is
required to “shoot” any armed individuals and “don’t shoot” any unarmed individuals. See
Figure 1 for an example of armed and unarmed targets.

Figure 1.

Example of targets.

Note: Examples include both armed and unarmed targets. Example targets taken from Correll et
al. (2002).

The task is presented on a computer screen and a computer keyboard is used to make
responses. Research has shown that exposure to stereotypical information can influence
6

responses in the FPST (Correll, Park, Judd, Wittenbrink, Sadler, & Keese, 2007), showing
facilitation for behavioral responses that match the stereotype. For example, participants are
faster at shooting armed Black targets when compared to armed White targets. Participants are
also more accurate at making “shoot” decisions to armed Black targets when compared to armed
White targets.
In order to further explore how stereotypic information can affect behavior, the term
“stereotype” must be defined. A stereotype is a mental category that is associated with a social
group (Kunda, 1999). This category can contain many features that are associated with the
group, such as personality traits or physical characteristics. Accordingly, a stereotype can be
viewed within a semantic network (Collins & Loftus, 1975) context as a concept node with
various related nodes that contain defining characteristics of the stereotype. Given that a
stereotype category is thought to be automatically activated at perception (Dovidio, Kawakami,
Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997), nodes that are related to the stereotype will receive
activation when exposed to the stereotype category. This spreading of activation facilitates the
processing of these related concepts. Thus, seeing a target person on screen during the shooter
task will automatically spread activation to the stereotypes that are associated with that person.
Because the stereotypes associated with Black people include associations with the concepts of
violence and other aggressive traits (Devine, 1989; Sagar and Schofield, 1980), facilitation of
threat-related information should occur. The opposite should be true for White targets in the task
because they are not associated with those same negative stereotypes. Many studies show
evidence that racial stereotypes can lead to biases in object identification, behavior
interpretations, and decision making in a way that is expected from the spreading activation
account (Correll et al., 2015; Bargh et al., 1988; Correll et al., 2007). In addition, presenting
7

stimuli in a context in which stereotypical traits are primed can bias evaluations and decision
making about those stimuli (Higgins et al., 1975).
Results from Bargh et al. (1988) show that these stereotypes are long-term, persistent
associations that are unique from other short-term, more transient associations. Bargh et al.
(1998) described stereotype biases as a readily available belief that exists due to frequent and
consistent exposure to a particular social behavior (e.g., aggression). These chronically
accessible associations were shown to be activated by any situation or stimulus that had features
associated with the construct. This association was established by having participants make
social judgments about a person’s character after reading a short sentence describing a socially
ambiguous action (e.g., “she always talks on the phone”). In this example, having a negative
association between women being talkative or more prone to gossip would negatively skew a
reader’s interpretation of that sentence. In contrast, experimental primes were used to induce
short-term associations between certain social groups and behavior. Results showed that
judgements made at a short delay following the experimental prime were more congruent with
the experimentally induced short-term bias. However, when the delay between prime and
judgment was long, the people who had a chronically accessible stereotype based their social
judgments from their long-term bias. This experiment has two important implications: (1) a
person’s preexisting bias can influence how they interpret novel situations, and (2) this bias can
be overcome with experimental priming, but only for a short time before the weaker bias decays.
Because the association between Black people and danger is found even in young children
(Sagar and Schofield, 1980), a facilitation in threat-related stimuli for Black targets is assumed.
This facilitation should not be as present for White targets.

8

In line with the expectation of behavioral responses due to activated stereotypes, results
in the FPST consistently show a stereotype bias such that shoot responses are generally faster
and more frequent for armed Black targets when compared to armed White targets; “don’t shoot”
responses are faster and more frequent for unarmed White targets when compared to unarmed
Black targets (Correll et al., 2007; Correll et al., 2015). Using event-related potentials (ERPs),
time-locked signal averages of electrical current that is recorded on a person’s scalp using an
electroencephalogram (Woodman, 2010), Correll et al., 2006 found neurophysiological evidence
to bolsters these findings of stereotype bias. Given the high temporal resolution and sensitivity to
behavioral and cognitive processes, the ERP is well-suited for studying perception and attention.
Correll et al. (2006) showed a correlation between stereotype bias and ERPs associated with
threat perception and response inhibition. Black armed targets elicited higher threat perception
and lower response inhibition ERPs when compared to White armed targets. The reverse was
true for unarmed targets.
Additionally, Correll et al. (2007) found that exposing participants to stories about violent
criminals, describing them as either Black or White, influenced the decision to shoot. In
particular, stories that reinforced stereotypic association between Blacks and violence made
participants more likely to shoot stimuli containing Black targets when compared to stimuli
containing White targets. However, reading a story about a violent White criminal did not make
participants more likely to shoot White targets when compared to Black targets. In the Whitecriminal condition, participants responded to Black and White targets in the same manner. In
other words, an experimental prime that associates White targets with danger was required to
elicit the same shooter bias that Black targets elicit without any experimental priming. This
finding further supports the notion that the shooter bias against Black targets is due to a chronic
9

stereotypic association between race and threat-related expectancy. These types of associations
are well-known to produce biased decision-making choices (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1975).
In summary, there is both behavioral and neurophysiological evidence for a race-based
shooter bias that is sensitive to stereotype information. In order to understand how this bias can
exist, and ultimately what kind of factors can affect it, an examination of how task information is
processed during the FPST will be performed. Ultimately, only information regarding the
identity of the object being held is needed in order to perform the FPST successfully. However,
as the findings of race-based shooting bias suggest, other information (i.e., the race of the target)
is also being processed during shooting decisions. The extent to which this irrelevant information
affects the decision, then, is a critical question to answer. To help answer this question, the
following section will provide an overview of how the information needed to execute a simple
choice decision (i.e., a “shoot decision” in the FPST) is accumulated. Special attention will be
given to factors that can alter that accumulation and ultimately result in biased behavior.
Proactive vs. Reactive Control
Braver et al. (2007) proposed a dual mechanisms of control (DMC) theory of attention
that describes how people regulate their thoughts and behavior. The two mechanisms are
proactive control and reactive control. Proactive control can be described as sustained,
preparatory attentional processing (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012). This process requires
active maintenance of task-goal information and is associated with sustained neural activity
within the lateral prefrontal cortex (Paxton et al., 2008). Reactive control, on the other hand, is
attentional control that is employed as a reaction to the presentation of a stimulus. Contrary to
proactive control’s sustained lateral prefrontal cortex activation profile, reactive control is
associated with transient lateral prefrontal cortex neural activity that is only elicited after the
10

onset of a stimulus (Paxton et al., 2008). This process does not require active maintenance of
task goal information during the time leading up to the stimulus.
Utilizing proactive control is generally more demanding than utilizing reactive control.
For example, studies show that young children have a reduced ability to employ proactive
control in relation to their older counterparts (Lucenet & Blaye, 2014; Chevalier et al., 2015).
Additionally, low working memory capacity individuals are less likely to use proactive control
when completing cognitive control tasks when compared to high working memory individuals
(Wiemers & Redick, 2018; Gonthier et al., 2016).
The Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) provides a concrete example of the two processes being
involved in a cognitive task. A person using a purely reactive strategy will simply wait for the
presentation of a word and then reactively try to only attend to the ink color in order to make a
response. In contrast, a person using a purely proactive strategy will actively rehearse (for
example, constantly repeat “only focus on the color” to themselves) before the stimulus appears.
This proactive strategy can bias participants away from attending to the word by placing more
focus on the font color. To summarize, proactive and reactive control are two distinct attention
strategies that have unique neural signatures and are differentially associated with working
memory.
A common task used to measure reactive and proactive control usage is the AXcontinuous performance task (AX-CPT; Cohen et al., 1999). This task requires participants to
respond to cue-probe pairs of letters. Participants are required to respond “yes” any time they see
an “X” probe following an “A” cue. They respond “no” to any other cue-probe pair. The
standard version of this task presents the cue-probe pair A-X (the letter “A” followed by the
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letter “X”) for the majority of trials (70%). A-Y trials (“A” followed by not- “X”), B-X trials
(not- “A” followed by “X”), and B-Y trials (not-“A” followed by not-“X”) are infrequent.
Errors in the A-Y and B-X trials are indicative of a lapse in proactive and reactive control
strategies, respectively (Lesh et al., 2013; Locke & Braver, 2008). More errors are predicted to
occur in the A-Y trials for people who use a proactive approach to this task. Because seeing the
“A” cue will cause participants using a proactive strategy to prepare for an “X” to follow, it is
more likely that they make the “yes” response incorrectly. People using a reactive approach to
this task are reasoned to make more errors in the B-X condition because seeing the “X” probe is
more likely to cause a reactive participant to respond “yes” incorrectly due to basic stimulusresponse association (i.e., they have associated making a “yes” response when they see the “X”
probe).
The Stroop task is also used to obtain measures of proactive and reactive control
(Gonthier et al., 2016; Bugg, 2017). The Stroop task requires participants to ignore their
prepotent behavior (i.e., read the word) and perform another behavior (i.e., focus on the font
color). A standard Stroop task is typically half congruent trials (font color matches word) and
half incongruent (font color does not match word) and does not necessarily favor either control
mechanism. However, manipulations to the task can be made to bias participants to adopt either
a proactive or reactive strategy.
For example, presenting a mostly congruent Stroop block (i.e., the majority of the trials
have the word and the color match) allows a participant to rely on simply reading the word in
order to make a quick and accurate response. When incongruent trials during these blocks are
encountered, a participant who has been simply relying on word-reading must quickly shift away
from this strategy and inhibit reading the word in order to make quick and accurate responses. To
12

this end, Lesh et al. (2013) used this experimental manipulation as a measure of reactive control
ability. Conversely, presenting a mostly incongruent Stroop block requires participants to focus
constantly more on the font color leading to inhibition of the word reading response. This
manipulation results in participants utilizing more proactive control, resulting in a smaller Stroop
effect (i.e., the difference in response time between incongruent and congruent trials). This
reduction in the Stroop effect due to the proportion of congruent to incongruent trials is referred
to as a congruency effect.
In relation to reactive control, Jacoby et al. (2003) showed that words presented mostly in
a congruent form (80% congruent; 20% incongruent) produced a larger Stroop effect than words
presented mostly in an incongruent form (80% incongruent; 20% congruent). These results
showed that individual stimuli could have a unique congruency effect. Because a person cannot
know what item will be presented at any given time, the conclusion was that the congruency
effect could not be due to any preparatory proactive strategies and that the item-specific
congruency effect was facilitated by reactive control.
An alternative explanation for the item-specific congruency effect found in Jacoby et al.
(2003) is that participants were not employing reactive control in order to mitigate the Stroop
effect, rather, they simply learned stimulus-response associations between words and their most
frequent responses. To address this possible confound, Crump et al. (2007) showed contextspecific congruence effects independent of items. This was done by introducing a location
manipulation and using shapes along with the standard Stroop word stimuli. The experiment
presented a color word prime (always presented in white font) at fixation. Then, a shape (either a
square or circle) appeared randomly either below or above the fixation point. The color of the
shape was either congruent (matched the fixation color word) or incongruent. Crucially, a
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congruency proportion manipulation was conducted for the locations. Similar to the previously
performed item-specific manipulation of Jacoby et al. (2003), Stroop interference was mitigated
in locations that presented mostly incongruent shapes. Because there was no relevant connection
between shape and any color response, seeing location-based effects of congruency suggests that
people were not simply relying on cue-stimulus associations. Instead, they were using contextdependent cues (in this instance, location) in order to trigger reactive control.
Bugg (2017) did similar manipulations using the Stroop task in order to separate reactive
and proactive control. Similar to Lesh et al. (2013), Bugg (2017) used mostly incongruent and
mostly congruent blocks in order to either increase or decrease proactive control, respectively.
The reactive control manipulations, however, were more in depth and allowed for further
investigation into how reactive control and proactive control can interact with each other and
affect the Stroop effect. Words were either presented above the center of the screen or below the
center of the screen. The proportion of congruent trials presented in each location was
manipulated (e.g., the top location could present 80% congruent trials). Moreover, each color
word had its own proportion manipulation bias (e.g., the word “blue” could show up as
incongruent 80% of the time across all trials). Because participants did not know what location
or stimulus word would be used from trial to trial, this manipulation affected reactive control
processes. Interestingly, the Stroop effect was reduced for all words (biased or not) that were
presented in a location that was mostly incongruent. This finding shows that context-dependent
information (i.e., location) can be used to modulate reactive attentional control, and that control
can transfer to novel stimuli.
Examining how biased items are responded to in either mostly congruent or mostly
incongruent lists can provide insight into how proactive and reactive strategies interact. Because
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overall list-wide proportion is information that is known before stimulus onset, the list-wide
manipulations allow for proactive control processes. Mostly incongruent lists reduced the
facilitative effects of congruent trials, hypothesized to be due to attention being shifted away
from the word dimension and reducing conflict with font color. However, mostly congruent lists
increased the response times of incongruent trials, hypothesized to be due to more attention
being shifted to the word dimension and causing more conflict with font color. Taken all
together, these results suggest that proactive control is a better attentional strategy for resolving
conflict. Accordingly, conditions that promote proactive control in the shooter task should also
mitigate the shooter bias.
Applying a similar proportion manipulation to trials in the FPST, research has
demonstrated that the ratio of shoot to don’t shoot trials can affect the reliance of proactive
control (Brewer et al., 2016). When the experiment had infrequent shoot trials (80% don’t shoot),
participants with low working memory were more likely to respond don’t shoot on the 20
percent of the trials that required a shoot response. This trend was not found when the
experiment had infrequent don’t shoot trials. These results show that biasing someone to not
shoot causes everyone (regardless of working memory capacity) to be more liberal in making a
decision not to shoot; however, biasing someone to shoot only causes people with low working
memory to be more liberal when deciding to shoot. Relative to the central question of the current
review, it is important to point out that Brewer et al. (2016) did not manipulate the race of the
targets. Given the effect of race on decisions to shoot, this is a key manipulation that needs to be
considered. The omission of the race manipulation also does not allow any insight as to how
their proactive control manipulation would have played a part in the bias because there is no
stereotype congruency involved. Nevertheless, this finding does show initial evidence that
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manipulations made to affect proactive/reactive control strategies can alter shooting behavior.
Considering proactive control strategies are better suited to mitigate conflicting information,
manipulations that increase proactive control should produce a decrease in biased shooting
behavior in the FPST.
When thinking about the relationship between proactive control and shooting bias,
consider a participant seeing a stereotype incongruent (e.g., Black Unarmed) trial on the FPST.
Racial category information, along with concepts related to that category, will be activated upon
stimulus onset. Similar to how a person who is expecting an incongruent trial in the Stroop task
can proactively bias their attention toward the relevant word dimension, a person using proactive
control in the FPST could proactively bias their attention toward the object and therefore
attenuate processing of the irrelevant race information (Cohen et al., 1990). If this happens,
response times and accuracies to incongruent trials should be improved in comparison to
situations where proactive control is not being used. Conversely, congruent trials should show a
decrease in performance. For instance, a person only relying on reactive control will not have
any pre-stimulus biasing of attention. Thus, once a Black Unarmed target appears on the screen,
the irrelevant race information will probably be processed. This will in turn cause threat-related
concepts to be activated and produce more conflict in the participant who should be responding
in a non-threatening (“don’t shoot”) manner. The opposite is true for stereotype congruent (i.e.,
Black Armed) trials. Failure to suppress the racial information will activate the stereotype and its
related concepts and facilitate the correct, threat-related response (“shoot”). Thus, using
proactive control should mitigate shooter bias, whereas using reactive control should amplify the
shooter bias.
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Amodio and Swencionis (2018) found supporting evidence for this line of reasoning.
Amodio and Swencionis (2018) used the weapons identification task (WIT) to investigate how
proactive control decreases the attention given to irrelevant task information and increases the
attention given to relevant task information. The WIT (Payne, 2001) requires participants to
classify an object as either a gun or a tool. Critically, before each object is presented, a brief
presentation of either a Black or White male face is presented. Typical results show that
responses to stereotype congruent pairings (e.g., Black- gun; White-tool) are faster than
stereotype incongruent pairings, indicating racial bias. Amodio and Swencionis (2018) used a
proportion manipulation in the WIT such that there were blocks that were mostly stereotype
congruent, mostly stereotype incongruent, or neutral. As expected, the mostly congruent block,
where proactive control should be at its lowest, showed the most racially biased response trend.
Conversely, the mostly incongruent block, where proactive control should be at its highest,
showed no racially biased response trend. Using evoked-related potentials (ERPs), the
researchers also showed that neural activity associated with goal-directed attention was reduced
during the presentation of faces (irrelevant information) in the mostly incongruent condition.
This finding suggests an attenuation of task-irrelevant information, as what would be expected
when proactive control is high.
Additionally, neurological activity associated with conflict monitoring was attenuated
during the presentation of the to-be-classified object in the mostly incongruent block (Amodio &
Swencionis, 2018). This finding suggests that stereotype information that would have been
elicited from the face cue presented before the object was not present when participants were
making their responses, another result that would be expected when proactive control is high.
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In summary, recent behavioral and neurological evidence show that a proactive control
strategy is likely better at mitigating racial bias than a reactive control strategy. Although
exploring the differences between reactive and proactive control is useful in understanding
shooting bias, special considerations may be needed when analyzing the different strategies. For
example, it would be misguided to label an individual or a group as strictly “reactive” or
“proactive.” Instead, the usage of one strategy over another can vary greatly, even within the
same person during a single task. This variation can lead to an inability to detect differences in
strategy usage while using simple mean accuracy and response time measures, making it
important to explore the entire response time distribution (Weimers & Redick, 2018). Consider,
for example, the AX trials in the AX-CPT task. A proactive strategy user seeing the “A” cue
will prepare the appropriate response before the target “X” even appears. However, a reactive
strategy user will not prepare a response upon seeing the cue, requiring the person to process the
cue-probe pair and program the response only after seeing the “X” probe. Thus, using proactive
control during the AX trials will result in faster and more accurate responses when compared to
reactive control. Because a person is never purely proactive or reactive, when a mostly reactive
person does employ a proactive strategy, they will have a fast and accurate response similar to a
mostly proactive person. In other words, the low end (i.e., fast responses) of the response time
distribution can be similar between mostly reactive and mostly proactive strategies. However, the
high end (i.e., slow responses) of the distribution should show more differentiation between the
two strategies. Weiners and Redick (2018) showed this data trend for the AX-CPT task. Correct
responses on the high end of the response distribution curve were slower for people who relied
more on reactive control when compared to proactive control; no differences were found on the
low end of the distribution. This finding suggests that, if possible, a more nuanced analysis of
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response times should be considered when trying to differentiate proactive versus reactive
control in individuals or groups.
People with high working memory are more likely to use proactive control (Wiemers &
Redick, 2018; Gonthier, et al., 2016). With this in mind, an exploration into working memory
and how it plays a role in the utilization of proactive and reactive control needs to be conducted.
Accordingly, the following section will define working memory and explore its role in proactive
and reactive strategies.
A Three-Component Model of Working Memory
Working memory is a system of memory that can store and manipulate information that
plays a critical role in human thought and ability (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Working memory is
positively related to mental processing speed and domain-independent reasoning. The system is
also important for the conscious allocation of attention (Unsworth, 2016; Kane & Engle, 2003;
Bugg, 2017). Unsworth (2016) describes working memory as being composed of three separate
components. The first component is primary memory capacity. Primary memory is defined as the
set of active memory representations that can be consciously attended to and maintained at any
given time (Unsworth, 2016). The number of individual representations within primary memory
is thought to be very limited, around three to four items (Luck & Vogel, 1997). Items within
primary memory can be replaced with newly attended items once primary memory has exceeded
its capacity. Thus, primary memory is limited in capacity, short-term, and highly volatile. Any
tasks that require a person to maintain many items for a long period will require access to
secondary memory- a larger, more stable memory system. Secondary memory has a large
capacity and can hold information for a long time span (Unsworth, 2016).
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The second component of working memory is the ability to use primary memory to access
secondary memory (Unsworth, 2016). When performing a given task, information in primary
memory can be lost and must be retrieved from secondary memory. This primary memory to
secondary memory interaction is made possible by both deliberate and random processes. A
person can intentionally plan to make a retrieval from secondary memory or a random activation
of secondary information can appear in primary memory. Either way, the ability to access
secondary memory through primary memory is a vital component of working memory.
The third component to working memory is attentional control (Unsworth, 2016). Attentional
control is the ability to maintain memory representations in primary memory despite the
presence of distractors. Given that the items of primary memory are fragile and can be replaced
with the shifting of attention, attentional control can serve as a valuable guard against the
displacement of task-critical information. To this end, attentional control is critical for any task
that requires prolonged goal maintenance, and it has been found to be especially relevant when
examining the performance on tasks such as the Stroop task (Bugg, 2017).
Given the importance of all three of these working memory components, any experimental
measure of working memory should reflect all of these components. Simple span tasks, such as
the Automated Running Span (Broadway & Engle, 2010) or the Backwards Digit Span
(Unsworth & Engle, 2007) have been shown to be good measures of primary memory capacity.
These simple span tasks typically present a series of to-be-remembered items and have
participants recall the items in the correct order. The number of items in the series is varied. The
largest set size of items that can be remembered with perfect accuracy is thought to reflect the
primary memory capacity of the participant (Unsworth, 2016).
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Complex span tasks such as the Operation Span or Symmetry Span tasks have been
shown to be good measures of access to secondary memory through primary memory (Foster et
al., 2015; Unsworth, 2016). These complex tasks typically require participants to remember a
series of to-be-remembered items presented concurrently with another task. For example, the
Operation Span requires participants to solve basic arithmetic problems after the presentation of
to-be-remembered letters. This concurrent task increases the likelihood that items are displaced
from primary memory to secondary memory, requiring a greater reliance on secondary memory
retrieval processes when compared to simple span tasks (Unsworth, 2016). This retrieval process
also requires the attentional control component of working memory.
Finally, tasks such as the Flanker task and Antisaccade task provide a good measure for
working memory’s attentional control component (Poole & Kane, 2009; Unsworth, 2016). These
attentional control tasks typically require participants to focus on one relevant dimension of a
stimulus or behavior and inhibit all other irrelevant dimensions of distractor stimuli. For
example, the Antisaccade task requires participants to make eye movements in the opposite
direction of a blinking stimulus cue (Unsworth, 2016). It is important to note that the tasks
described are not a pure measure of one working memory component. For example, complex
span tasks also tap into primary memory capacity and attentional control. However, tasks can be
more sensitive to a given working memory component relative to other tasks and thus a more
representative measure of that component. In addition, all of these components of working
memory contribute to performance in tasks that do not necessarily involve working memory. For
example, the tasks used to measure the attentional control component are well established and
have been utilized to measure attentional control and executive functioning (e.g., Miyake et al.,
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2000). Taken all together in the context of this dissertation, examining the relationship between
working memory and shooting behavior should include measures of these three components.
Working Memory and Proactive/Reactive Control
The idea that proactive and reactive control are two distinct control strategies opens a
question concerning individual differences in the ability to use both strategies. Of particular
relevance to this dissertation is that they may be differentially affected by working memory. For
example, a hallmark of proactive control is that it requires a person to maintain goal information,
a task that relies on sustained attention made possible by working memory (Kane et al., 2007;
Unsworth et al., 2010). In terms of the three independent components of working memory,
proactive control can then be conceptualized as the working memory attentional control
component being used for task-goal maintenance (Unsworth, 2016). For reactive control, on the
other hand, the secondary memory access component may be more related. This relation is
suspected because reactive control strategies can require a reactivation of task goal or experiment
context information upon stimulus onset, information that is likely stored in secondary memory
during many experimental tasks.
In general, individuals with more ability (i.e., older vs. younger kids; high working
memory vs. low working memory) are more likely to use proactive control (Doebel et al., 2017;
Wiemers & Redick, 2018; Chevalier et al., 2015). In a child-adapted version of AX-CPT task,
Doebel et al. (2017) showed that very young children (3-year-olds) were more likely to rely on a
reactive strategy whereas older children (6-year-olds) were more likely to rely on a proactive
strategy. At the other end of the age spectrum, older adults (60-80-year-olds) are less able to use
top-down proactive strategies when compared to younger adults (Bugg, 2014). Bugg (2014)
showed this by using a list-wide proportion congruency manipulation within a Stroop task.
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The proportion of congruent trials in a list has important implications for cognitive
control (Kane & Engle, 2003). It is important because the active maintenance of the “focus-onthe-color” goal is crucial for incongruent trials but not important for congruent trials (e.g., “blue”
in blue ink). Thus, increasing the number of congruent trials, where the goal can be neglected
without consequence, should reduce the overall need to employ cognitive control and lead to a
higher likelihood of goal neglect in the incongruent trials (larger Stroop effect). On the other
hand, increasing the proportion of incongruent trials will require more cognitive control and lead
to a lower likelihood of goal neglect in the incongruent trials (smaller Stroop effect). In addition
to list-wide proportion manipulations, there were also item-specific proportion manipulations.
For example, the word “red” could have been presented in congruent form 75% of the time, or
the word “blue” could have been presented in incongruent form 75% of the time. These items
were considered biased items. The Stroop effect found for neutral items presented in a mostly
incongruent list was compared to the Stroop effect for neutral items presented in a mostly
congruent list. It was hypothesized that, due to the heightened top-down proactive control
elicited by having frequent incongruent trials, the Stroop effect for neutral items would be
smaller when presented in a mostly incongruent list than in any other list. Results from Bugg
(2014) showed that older adults showed no difference in responding to neutral items whether
they were presented in a mostly congruent or mostly incongruent list. In contrast, younger adults
showed a clear reduction in the Stroop effect for items presented in a mostly incongruent list. As
stated earlier, taking advantage of list-wide proportion manipulations requires proactive control.
Thus, the results suggest that older adults are less able to employ proactive control than their
younger counterparts.
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Weimers and Redick (2018) found that people with high working memory capacity were
more likely to use proactive control than people with low working memory capacity. Using an
AX-CPT task, it was found that low working memory capacity individuals relied more heavily
on reactive control and were slower and less accurate on AX trials. However, over time, low
working memory individuals increased their use of proactive control during the task. This
proactive shift manifested itself as a decrease in performance for AY trials. Decreasing
performance in AY trials show that lower working memory individuals’ responses were
becoming more reliant on the cue as the experiment progressed. High working memory
individuals, on the other hand, were consistent in their use of proactive control throughout the
study and did not show such behavioral patterns.
Richmond et al. (2016) found similar working memory/control interactions two years
prior in a modified AX-CPT task that included a novel trial type, CX trials. These CX trials were
responded to using a unique key press that was neither “target” nor “non-target.” Including these
trials made it such that seeing the “X” was not as associated with the “target” key response,
reducing the likelihood of participants developing a simple stimulus-response association that
could confound the measure of reactive control the BX trials are designed to represent. Critically,
after reducing the likelihood that BX responses were a result of simple stimulus-response
associations, the same behavior trend between low and high working memory individuals for the
different trial types is found in both Richmond et al. (2016) and Weimers and Redick (2018),
lending more evidence for the reactive control account of BX trial behavior.
In line with the relationship between working memory and proactive control, Maraver et
al. (2016) showed a connection between practice on working memory tasks and a tendency to
use proactive control on the AX-CPT task. The experiment had two separate groups perform a
24

series of tasks before they completed the AX-CPT task. One group completed working memory
capacity (Operation Span task) and attention control (Stop-Signal task) tasks. The other group
completed processing speed tasks (visual search and categorization tasks). Results showed that
the group who performed the working memory tasks showed a higher tendency to use proactive
control when compared to the group who performed the processing speed tasks. This finding not
only shows a relationship between working memory and proactive control but also suggests that
the cognitive control used in earlier tasks can influence cognitive control (particularly proactive
control) in a later task.
Additionally, the attention control needed to inhibit a well-practiced (prepotent) behavior
is heavily reliant on working memory. Roberts et al. (1994) argues that low prepotent tasks rely
more heavily on current working memory load and are therefore more susceptible to being
interrupted. An anti-saccade task was used to test this theorized relationship between working
memory and ability to block a high-prepotent response. The Antisaccade task requires
participants to look away from a flashing stimulus on one side of the screen and identify a very
briefly presented stimulus (50 ms) presented on the opposite side of the screen. When the
flashing stimulus is presented on screen, the high-prepotent response would be to make a saccade
to that stimulus, whereas a low-proponent response would be to make a saccade in the opposite
direction of the stimulus. Results showed that increasing working memory load (using a
concurrent arithmetic task) resulted in poorer Antisaccade performance. In other words,
increasing working memory load reduced participants’ ability to exert cognitive control.
Unsworth and Engle (2007) showed similar results in that low working memory was
associated with low Antisaccade performance when compared to high working memory. Low
working memory participants were slower and less accurate. This poor performance was
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especially pronounced when prosaccade and Antisaccade trials were intermixed in the same
block. Like the explanation in Kane and Engle (2003), it was argued that low working memory
participants could not properly maintain the required task goal when the task demands were
constantly changing. When active maintenance of the goal failed, participants had to retrieve the
task goal using cue-based retrieval from long-term memory. Thus, working memory is an
important factor in the maintenance and retrieval of task goals and plays an important role in
selecting the correct response in many tasks. In terms of the FPST, working memory load should
be critical in maintaining the task goal of “only shoot armed targets” (or “do not shoot unarmed
targets”) and affect shooting performance.
Using similar theoretical reasoning as Roberts et al. (1994), Kane and Engle (2003)
showed that the resolution between competing responses in incongruent Stroop trials depends on
attentional processes devoted to the appropriate visual cues, and this attentional process will only
be engaged if the correct goal (i.e., “ignore the word”) is maintained in memory. This reasoning
was shown by classifying participants as having either high working memory or low working
memory using the Operation Span (Turner & Engle, 1989) and Reading Span tasks (Daneman &
Carpenter, 1980) and presenting all participants with a 0% congruent and a 75% congruent block
of Stroop trials. Results showed that low working memory participants were slower than high
working memory participants on interference trials for the 75% congruent blocks compared to
interference trials on the 0% congruent blocks. Additionally, after emphasizing accuracy over
response time, low working memory participants showed lower accuracy in the interference
trials for the 75% congruent block. These results show that working memory plays a critical role
in maintaining task goals. Interestingly, the experimental manipulation put an emphasis on goal
maintenance, a process that should be most associated with the attentional control component of
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working memory. However, the researchers found working memory effects using complex span
tasks which are theorized to be more representative of secondary memory access. The fact that a
reliable relationship was still found supports the idea that no task is component pure and the
complex span task measured enough attentional control to reveal significant results. When
considering the three component theory of working memory, it is expected that even stronger
relationships would have been found if the researchers would have used tasks that better
represent the attentional control component.
In addition to using task accuracy as an indicator of reduced goal maintenance, reaction
time was also examined as an indicator of reduced response inhibition. Drawing from previous
response time models of Stroop interference (Heathcote et al., 1991) that showed an overall shift
in reaction time latencies for incongruent trials when compared to control trials, the 0%
incongruent blocks were further explored. Reaction times on the 0% incongruent block were
compared between low working memory and high working memory participants. Because the
block was 0% congruent, active goal maintenance was thought to be almost entirely unnecessary.
With the effects of maintaining a goal mostly removed from working memory, differences
between low and high working memory participants could be primarily attributed to response
inhibition. Results showed low working memory participants were still slower than high working
memory participants in the 0% congruent condition. This result suggests that, in addition to goal
maintenance, working memory also plays a role in response inhibition. The extent to which
response inhibition plays a role in the overall bias, however, is still unclear due to the effect only
appearing when collapsing across multiple experiments in order to get more statistical power.
Given that this collapsing procedure was only necessary for finding significance in the response
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time analysis, the link between working memory and response inhibition may not be robust
enough to provide valuable task-relevant information on small sample sizes.
Interestingly, working memory and proactive/reactive control is not only sensitive to
actual task demand but also expected task demand (Speer et al., 2003). Using a classic Sternberg
paradigm (Sternberg, 1966), Speer et al. (2003) manipulated the number of items that
participants expected to maintain. When participants were expecting a large memory set (~8
items), behavioral and neural data suggested a proactive control strategy was used. Conversely,
when they were expecting a small memory set (~3 items) their behavioral and neural data was
more indicative of a reactive control strategy. Crucially, this disassociation between the two
expectancy conditions was found even after controlling for the actual size of the memory set (6
items). These results suggest that the use of proactive and reactive control is sensitive to working
memory load expectancy. Importantly, the study cannot show whether the “decision” to use one
strategy or another is made with conscious intent, but rather shows that the use of either strategy
is an option that is flexible and contingent on task demands.
The Antisaccade and Stroop experiments show that working memory plays a role in the
ability to engage in cognitive control for both proactive goal maintenance and reactive response
inhibition. The degree to which working memory affects goal maintenance when compared to
response inhibition is not as clear, however some results do show a more robust effect of goal
maintenance. Given how critical working memory, especially the attentional control component
(Unsworth, 2016), is to the ability to engage proactive control, experimental manipulations that
increase the usage of proactive control should be more sensitive to working memory differences.
This relationship should be especially strong for the attentional control component of working
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memory. On the other hand, experimental manipulations that reduce the usage of proactive
control should show less of a relationship to working memory.
In summary, proactive and reactive control are two different processes, with proactive
control being more employed by people with high working memory. These different control
processes have different behavioral signatures that can be captured by different tasks such as the
AX-CPT or versions of the Stroop task. Additionally, a person is unlikely to be strictly proactive
or strictly reactive. Studies that examine proactive versus reactive control typically expect
participants to be able to perform both strategies, with the primary point of interest being how
often the harder strategy (proactive control) is used over the other. Because working memory is
associated with the ability to use these control strategies, and these control strategies can be
critical in mitigating shooter bias, the following section will examine how working memory
interacts with attentional control in order to affect shooting behavior.
Working Memory, Attention, and Shooting Behavior
Previous research has shown that shooting behavior is linked to working memory and
attentional control strategies. For example, Brewer et al. (2016) found an association between
working memory and shooting behavior. Overall, people with high working memory showed
better performance on a version of the FPST. High working memory individuals showed higher
sensitivity (d’) between armed and unarmed trials, a measure that demonstrates better accuracy
on the task. High working memory people also demonstrated appropriate criterion (c) adjustment
as the proportion of shoot trials changed; low working memory individuals did not show a
similar adjustment. This behavioral pattern shows that only the high working memory people
decreased their tendency to shoot as the proportion of shoot trials decreased. Importantly,
working memory was measured in this study using the Reading Span and Symmetry Span tasks.
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Thus, an emphasis on one component of working memory, access to secondary memory, was
examined. The other two components, primary capacity and attention control, were not as
heavily represented in the measure of working memory. Additionally, target race was not
examined. Although these key factors that are relevant to the main questions of this dissertation
were not explored, the results of this study do give initial evidence that working memory can
affect responses in the FPST, with lower working memory being associated with more
aggressive shooting behavior. Also, showing that higher working memory people were more
sensitive to proportion manipulations provides supporting evidence to the fact that proactive
control is positively correlated with working memory.
Correll et al. (2014), however, did show a link between working memory capacity and
racial shooter bias. This was done by introducing various levels of working memory load to both
experts and novices during the shooter task. Participants heard a constant string of numbers
while performing the shooter task. Participants under no load were instructed to ignore the
numbers. Participants under the medium load were instructed to determine if the number they
heard was greater or less than five. Participants in the high load condition had to compare the
currently spoken word with the previously heard word. Experts performed extensive training in
the shooter task, whereas novices had no prior training. The low load condition showed the
typical shooter bias for novices, but no bias for experts. However, the high load condition also
elicited the bias in experts. This behavioral pattern showed that people who were initially good at
reducing the effects of stereotype bias on their shooting behavior became bad at mitigating the
stereotypical behavior once their working memory was taxed during the task. This finding
supports the notion that working memory is important for unbiased shooting behavior. However,
similar to Brewer et al. (2016), the components of working memory were not differentiated.
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Ito et al. (2015), on the other hand, explored a more nuanced relationship between
working memory and biased behavior. They used the FPST along with the weapons
identification task (WIT) in order to extract a latent “implicit bias” factor that was used to
measure stereotype-biased behavior. Factor loadings from the FPST and WIT were standardized
and constrained such that they equally contributed to the implicit bias factor. Two working
memory components, attention control and capacity, were also represented by a latent factor (3
tasks in both factors). Results showed no relationship between the capacity component of
working memory and implicit bias. However, the attention control component of working
memory was negatively associated with bias, indicating that an increase of attentional control
decreased biased behavior on both the FPST and WIT. These findings suggest that the three
working memory components are not equally related to shooting bias. It is important to note that
the researchers were examining bias through a theory of executive function and were not
necessarily tying to differentiate the different components of working memory as described by
Unsworth (2016), the approach utilized in the current dissertation. Additionally, because there
were no manipulations of proactive and reactive control, the study cannot examine how these
attentional strategies, which are also known to mitigate bias, interact with the different working
memory components.
Implications for Study 1 and Study 2
A central question of the dissertation is whether the usage of proactive/reactive control on
one task is predictive of proactive/reactive control on another task. Even though there is ample
evidence that these two control strategies are distinct and show distinct behavioral and neural
markers, the question of whether there are individual differences in control strategy preference
has received relatively little attention. Doebel et al. (2017) found evidence that 5- and 6-year31

olds who used proactive control on a stimulus tracking paradigm were also inclined to use
proactive control on well-established tasks of proactive control such as the task-switching and
AX-CPT tasks. It is important to mention, however, that this study was done with young children
and used a second task to measure transfer that is quite different from the shooter task.
Nevertheless, this is a promising result because it shows that performance on tasks such as the
AX-CPT could be predictive of proactive control usage in the shooter task.
If it is possible to measure and predict control strategy use across tasks including the
FPST, the next logical question to ask is how these control mechanisms play a role in biased
shooting behavior. Although previous studies have explored the role of working memory in
shooter bias, none have explicitly examined the dual mechanisms model of proactive and
reactive control (Braver, 2012). With the success of the dual mechanisms model in explaining
the Stroop task, it is likely that similar methods can be successfully applied to the FPST. This
assumption is made because the two tasks have a critical parallel in terms of cognitive control
(Correll et al., 2014). Accordingly, in the same way the dual mechanisms model can show how
control failures in the Stroop task occur, it could also show how control failures occur in
decisions to shoot.
Finally, the interaction between working memory and proactive/reactive control is
explored in relation to mitigating the shooter bias. Because working memory can be decomposed
into a capacity component and an attentional control component, it could be the case that only
one of those components is critical for proactive/reactive control in the context of mitigating
bias. The attentional control component of working memory was expected to be more related to
proactive/reactive control than the capacity component of working memory.
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In summary, working memory and attentional control strategies (i.e., proactive and
reactive control) are important factors that can mitigate shooter bias. Moreover, within working
memory, the attentional control component is hypothesized to be the most relevant to mitigating
racial shooting bias. To date, no study has examined the influence of attentional control
strategies on shooting bias while considering the independent components of working memory.
Study 1 aims to fill in this gap in the literature. Study 2 is designed to measure proactive and
reactive control tendencies and relate these to racial bias in the FPST.
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CHAPTER III
STUDY 1
Study 1, a collection of three critical FPST manipulations, was conducted to (1) replicate
the “shooter bias” effects, and (2) provide a first step in understanding the relationship between
shooting bias and the capacity, secondary memory access, and attentional control components of
working memory. It was hypothesized that stereotype congruent trials would be faster and more
accurate than stereotype incongruent trials in the shooter task. Additionally, working memory
was hypothesized to be negatively associated with racial shooting bias such that higher working
memory would result in lower bias. Lastly, it was hypothesized that increasing participants’
proactive control usage would reduce shooting bias. To test these hypotheses, participants
completed three working memory tasks and one of three versions of the FPST. One version was
a control manipulation that presented 50% stereotype congruent trials. Another version was
meant to shift participants to a more reactive control strategy and presented 80% stereotype
congruent trials. The third version was intended to shift participants to a more proactive control
strategy and presented 20% stereotype congruent trials.
Method
Participants
Participants were excluded from analysis based on their performance on the sentence
verification task of the Reading Span (requiring 70% accuracy). The control manipulation had 70
participants after 10 were excluded due to Reading Span criterion performance. The mostly
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congruent manipulation had 60 participants after 3 were excluded, and the mostly incongruent
manipulation had 84 after 4 were excluded. The sample was restricted to only include people
who self-identified as Caucasian in order avoid any potential differences between ingroup and
outgroup racial bias effects within the FPST (Kahn & Davies, 2011).
Design
The design of the FPST was a 2 (Gun: Armed or Unarmed) by 2 (Target Race: Black or
White) by 3 (Shooter Condition: Control, Mostly Congruent, or Mostly Incongruent). The Gun
and Target Race variables were within-subjects and the Shooter Condition was between-subjects.
Data for the three shooter conditions were collected as three separate experiments in the
following chronological order: Baseline, Mostly Congruent, Mostly Incongruent. These
experiments were conducted in serial order (e.g., the Baseline conditions was first) throughout an
approximate 12-month time frame. They are presented in this chapter as manipulations within
one study, but it should be noted that the participants were not randomly assigned to each
condition in the FPST.
FPST
Baseline FPST. The task stimuli were color target images depicting a single young male
holding either a gun or a non-gun. These set of target image contained 20 different background
images of public places (e.g., a train station, park, office lobby, etc.). Within each target image,
one of 48 different target people is presented. Target people could be either African American or
White males. Every target person was presented as armed and unarmed throughout the task.
There were two different gun objects (a silver revolver and a black 9-mm pistol) and four nongun objects (a silver aluminum can, a silver camera, a black cell-phone, and a black wallet).
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These stimuli combined for four conditions: Black Unarmed, Black Armed, White Unarmed, and
White Armed. Participants were instructed to “shoot” any target they saw holding a gun and
“not shoot” when they saw a person holding something other than a gun. The shoot response was
the letter “q” on the keyboard and the “don’t shoot” response was the letter “p.” All responses
had to be made within 700 ms of target presentation. Targets were always presented one at a
time, holding an object, while either standing or kneeling. The task also awarded and deducted
points for correct and incorrect responses. Participants received 10 points for every correct
“shoot” response and 5 points for every correct “don’t shoot” response. They lost 20 points for
every incorrect “shoot” response, 40 points for every incorrect “don’t shoot” response, and 10
points for every timeout.
All trials, whether practice or experimental, followed the same procedure. A trial began
with a 1000-ms fixation cross. After the fixation cross, filler pictures of random scenes were
presented for a random number of monitor refresh cycles between 29–59 cycles (at 60hz); filler
picture duration lengths ranged from 483 to 984 ms, in intervals of roughly 17 ms. The number
of filler pictures randomly varied between one and three. After the filler pictures, the target scene
(without a target person) appeared for a random duration that was identical to the filler pictures.
After the target scene image, another image depicting the same target scene appeared with the
addition of a single target person presented within the scene. This target picture appeared on the
screen until the participant made a response or the response deadline of 700 ms was reached.
This deadline was used based on pilot studies and a FPST meta-analysis (Mekawi & Bresin,
2015). Participants received feedback after every trial. The feedback was “correct,” “incorrect,”
or “too slow” depending on the participants’ response. The feedback screen also gave
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participants their cumulative score. The score presentation provided motivation for participants
to perform well on the task.
The baseline FPST began with instructions on the response mappings of “shoot” and
“don’t shoot.” After the instructions, four trials of each condition were presented, resulting in 16
practice trials. After the practice trials, the participants’ cumulative score was reset to 0 and 96
experimental trials were presented. There were 96 experimental trials (24 trials per condition).
Accuracy and response time were collected for all trials.
Mostly congruent FPST. The mostly congruent version of the FPST followed the same
procedure as the baseline FPST, with the addition of two new target person stimuli and 20 new
target scenes. Thus, there were 50 target people and 40 target scenes. There were 180 total
experimental trials. These trials were 80% stereotype congruent (i.e., Black Armed; White
Unarmed) and 20% stereotype incongruent (i.e., Black Unarmed; White Armed). There were 18
Black unarmed, 72 Black armed, 72 White unarmed, and 18 White armed trials, resulting in an
equal number of armed and unarmed trials. This FPST version should elicit more reactive control
because most of the trials are stereotype congruent and do not require participants to ignore
irrelevant information in order to make a correct response. Thus, participants will be less likely
to use any attentional filtering processes until after (post-stimulus, reactive control) a conflict has
been presented.
For both stereotype congruent conditions, only 18 of the 72 trials were analyzed. These
18 “critical trials” were unique stimuli that had never been seen before by the participant. Once a
critical stimulus had been seen, it could be used as one of the remaining 54 stereotype congruent
trials at a later time in the experiment. Critical and non-critical trials were spaced out evenly
across 6 blocks of trials (30 trials in each block).
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Mostly incongruent FPST. The mostly incongruent FPST followed the identical
procedure as the mostly congruent FPST except the 180 trials were 80% stereotype incongruent
and 20% stereotype congruent. This FPST version should elicit more proactive control because
most trials do require participants to ignore irrelevant information in order to make a correct
response. Thus, participants will be more likely to use attentional strategies that mitigate the
effects of irrelevant information throughout the entire block.
Working Memory Tasks
The working memory tasks were selected to represent the three components of working
memory: primary memory capacity, secondary memory access, and attentional control. The
Automated Running Span and backward digit span task scores were summed in order to
represent the primary memory capacity component. The Symmetry Span task was used to
represent the secondary memory access component. The Antisaccade task was used to represent
the attentional control component. These tasks have been shown to be a valid measure of
working memory (Unsworth, 2016).
Automated Running Span. The Automated Running Span (Broadway & Engle, 2010), a
measure of primary memory capacity, required participants to view a string of letters and
remember the last few letters in the string. All stimuli were white letters in Arial font (.1 inches
in height). The string ranged between 4 and 9 letters in length, requiring participants to
remember between 3 to 6 letters. There were 3 trials of each memory set length, for a total of 12
trials. A practice block of six trials (three trials of both memory set size 3 and memory set size 4)
were presented before the real trials.
Each trial began with a prompt that told the participants to “Remember the last “X”
letters.” The presentation of the letter set only began once the participant responded to the
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prompt by pressing the spacebar. Each letter in the set was presented for 300 ms, with each letter
separated by a 300-ms blank mask. After all the letters in the set were presented, a response
prompt that read “Please type in the last “X” letters” was presented. Participants then had 15
seconds to type their response before the next trial began. Only letters recalled in the correct
serial order were counted as correct. Participants could type the “X” button for any letters within
a string that they did not remember. The letter “X” was never used as an actual stimulus letter
within a memory set.
Backwards Digit Span. The Backwards Digit Span (Unsworth & Engle, 2007), a
measure of primary memory capacity, required participants to view a series of numbers and
recall the series in reverse order. All stimuli were white numbers in Arial font (.1 inches in
height). The series ranged between 2 and 8 numbers in length. There were two trials of each
memory set length, for a total of 14 trials.
Each trial presents numbers one by one until the response prompt, is presented. Each
number in the set was presented for 500 ms, with each number separated by a 500-ms blank
mask. After all the numbers in the set were presented, a response prompt that read “Please type
the numbers in reverse order” was presented. Like the Automated Running Span task,
participants were given a maximum of 15 seconds to respond and could use the “X” letter as a
placeholder for any forgotten digit. Only digits recalled in the correct serial order were counted
as correct.
Scores for the Automated Running Span and Backwards Digit Span task were
standardized and summed in order to get a measure of primary memory capacity. This summed
measure was called the “Runback” score.
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Symmetry Span. The shortened version of the Symmetry Span task, a measure of
secondary memory access, was used (Foster et al., 2015). The Symmetry Span task contained
two subtasks. The first subtask required participants to remember the spatial location of a
sequence of red squares presented on a 4 X 4 grid. The squares appeared one at a time. The
number of to-be-remembered squares randomly varied between 2 to 5. After the sequence of red
squares was presented, recall on the task required participants to use a computer mouse to fill in
a blank 4 x 4 grid with red squares in the correct location and order. A number appeared in each
square when it was selected. This number represented the squares’ position in the sequence. If
the participant could not remember one of the squares, they could click a “Blank” box as a
placeholder for the forgotten square. Correct responses were recorded for each square that is
accurately recalled on its spatial and sequence location.
For the second subtask, participants judged whether filler images were symmetrical along
its vertical axis. A picture is vertically symmetrical if it can be vertically folded in half and have
the picture on the left line up with the picture on the right. All images were an 8 x 8 grid of
squares with various squares filled in black. After viewing an image, participants were then
prompted with the question, “Is this symmetrical?” Participants responded by clicking one of two
boxes marked “Yes” or “No” with a computer mouse.
To summarize the overall Symmetry Span procedure, the task began with four practice
sets of remembering the spatial location of red squares. After those practice sets, participants
then performed 15 practice image symmetry judgment trials. Finally, participants had three
practice trials of doing both tasks at the same time. When doing both tasks at the same time,
participants first saw a to-be-remembered red square. After the red square, participants then
made a symmetry judgment. After the symmetry judgment, participants then saw another red
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square. This sequence continued for 2-5 cycles. At the end of the sequence, participants had to
recall the location and order of the red squares. The mean response time for the symmetry trials
was calculated and used as the response deadline for symmetry decisions in the experimental
trials that followed the practice session.
After the participants finished this practice session, they then completed 48 real trial
sequences. There were 12 trials of each sequence length (i.e., sequence length 2, 3, 4, and 5).
Participants were informed that they must maintain 80% accuracy on the symmetry judgment
trials. They were also told that their mean response time of the practice symmetry trials was used
as the response time window. Once the response window timed out, the experiment presented the
next red square in the sequence and the skipped symmetry trial was scored as incorrect.
Participants were shown their mean accuracy after each symmetry trial. This procedure was
utilized in order to reduce the likelihood that participants could rehearse the to-be-remembered
square sequences during the intervening symmetry trials. Symmetry Span scores were calculated
by totaling the number of correctly recalled squares, however this score was only calculated for
participants who scored above the 80% accuracy threshold in the symmetry task.
Antisaccade. The Antisaccade task, a measure of attentional control, required
participants to make eye movements away from an attention-grabbing cue. The task began with
instructions informing the participants that they needed to determine whether a “B”, “P”, or “R”
was presented on screen by pressing the 1, 2, or 3 key on the keyboard, respectively. Participants
were warned that the letters were only presented for a short period before they were replaced by
another letter or number. A demonstration of a trial was shown along with the correct answer.
After the instructions, participants performed 18 practice letter identification trials. Each practice
trial started with a solid black screen with “Ready?” in the center. While on this screen,
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participants pressed the space bar to begin a trial. Once participants hit the spacebar, a black
screen appeared for 400 ms. The fixation cross then appeared for a duration time randomly
selected from the following set of times: 200, 600, 1000, 1400, 1800, or 2200 ms. The fixation
cross was followed by a 100-ms blank screen and then the target letter appears for 100 ms. The
target letter was then replaced by a mask that was either the capital letter “H” or an “8.” These
masks remained on the screen until a response was made.
After the practice trials, participants were then given instructions for the full trials. The
full trials presented two empty boxes on either side of the fixation cross. At the start of a trial, an
equal (“=”) sign appeared in one of the boxes. The equal sign was a cue to the participant to look
at the opposite box. The equal sign appeared for 100 ms, disappeared for 16 ms, then reappeared
for another 100 ms (creating a blinking effect). Participants were told that the target letter was
always in the opposite box from the cue and if they did not see the letter, they should quickly
make their best guess. There were 54 full trials of the Antisaccade task. The first 18 of those
trials were treated as practice trials and were not analyzed, resulting in a total of 36 experimental
trials that were scored for both accuracy and response time.
Results
Racial Shooter Bias
In order to determine whether the shooting bias effect could be replicated, four different
measures were analyzed from the shooter tasks: response time, accuracy, d-prime (d’), and
criterion (c). Signal detection measures, d’ and c, were also used to measure shooting bias. All
signal detection measures necessarily excluded timeouts because a timeout cannot be classified
as either a miss or a false alarm, two response categories that are critical to the d’ and c
dependent measures used in the analysis. The d’ measure represents how well participants can
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discriminate between armed and unarmed targets. The c measure represents how liberal or
conservative participants are at deciding to shoot. When c equals zero, participants evenly weight
evidence to “shoot” and “don’t shoot” targets. Negative c values represent a liberal shooting
threshold; positive values represent a conservative shooting threshold. The d-prime and criterion
measures were calculated using the “psycho” library in R. D-prime was calculated as the Z value
of hit-rate (H) minus the Z value of false alarm rate (FA): d’ = z(H) – z(FA). Criterion was
calculated as the number of standard deviations away from the midpoint between the signal and
noise distributions.
Response time. Refer to Table 1 and Figure 2 for a summary of the response time
descriptive statistics across the three FPST conditions.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Response Time Dependent Measure
Experiment
Baseline

Mostly
Congruent

Mostly
Incongruent

Condition

Mean

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

Min

Max

Black Armed

523.83

79.64

-0.12

-0.35

260

698

Black Unarmed

587.47

68.14

-0.69

-0.48

308

699

White Armed

534.60

81.46

-0.12

-0.52

279

699

White Unarmed

585.06

66.97

-0.61

0.11

641

699

Black Armed

537.73

84.25

-1.46

6.36

17.31

698

Black Unarmed

593.16

68.19

-1.82

9.32

0.27

696

White Armed

541.27

86.74

-0.76

2.12

3.00

699

White Unarmed

579.25

74.51

-2.07

9.50

53.00

699

Black Armed

539.81

69.83

0.03

-0.51

350.36

683.71

Black Unarmed

593.21

56.22

-0.42

-0.28

400.15

683.63

White Armed

533.96

68.80

0.02

-0.54

333.50

683.61

White Unarmed

592.02

58.23

-0.49

-0.34

383.61

683.67

Note: All data were response time scores measured in milliseconds (ms).
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Figure 2.

Mean response times in seconds for the three shooter conditions.

Note: Error bars represent standard error. MC = Mostly Congruent; MI = Mostly Incongruent.

Linear mixed effects (LME) models were used to analyze all measures. The random
effects structure of this LME model and the subsequent accuracy models was selected by
beginning with the maximal model that included random intercepts for participant and target
scene as well as random slopes of gun and race for participant, target person, and target scene.
Random effects that did not account for significant variance were dropped to develop a
parsimonious random effects structure for each model (Matuschek et al., 2017).
For response time, Race (Black or White), Gun (Armed or Unarmed) and the three
working memory measures (Antisaccade, Runback, and Symmetry Span) were fixed effects. The
working memory measures were standardized and not allowed to interact with each in the model.
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The working memory measures were allowed to interact with the Gun and Race fixed effects.
The stimulus background images (20 in total) and participants were random effects. Higher-order
interactions that were not significant were dropped from LME models. These reductions were
done one term at a time, starting with the most complex non-significant term. This process was
done in order to interpret lower-order interactions. For example, a significant Race X Gun
interaction was not interpreted if the model still included a non-significant Race X Gun X
Attentional Control interaction. Only correct trials were included in the response time analysis.
Refer to Table 2 for a summary of the fixed effects across all three experiments.
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Table 2
LME Fixed Effects for Response Time (ms) for the Three Experiments
Predictor

Estimate (ms)

SE

t

p

Model 1. Test for shooting bias in the Control condition
(Intercept)

0.56

.006

101.24

< .001

Gun

-0.03

.002

-11.35

< .001

Race

-0.01

.002

-0.97

.338

Gun:Race

-0.01

.002

-1.86

.071

Model 2. Test for shooting bias in the Mostly Congruent condition
(Intercept)

0.56

.006

96.15

< .001

Gun

-0.02

.004

-6.23

< .001

Race

0.00

.003

0.59

.559

Antisaccade

-0.01

.004

-2.96

.004

Gun:Race

-0.01

.003

-1.65

.109

Model 3. Test for shooting bias in the Mostly 0.00Incongruent condition
(Intercept)

0.57

.006

98.27

< .001

Gun

-0.03

.004

-7.08

< .001

Race

0.00

.004

0.85

.406

Antisaccade

-0.01

.003

-2.58

.012

Runback

-0.01

.003

-2.14

.036

Gun:Race

-0.00

.004

-0.03

.979

Note: All factors were coded using sum coding. The levels of the Gun variable were Armed and
Unarmed, with Armed coded as 1 and Unarmed coded as -1. The levels of the Race variable
were Black and White, with Black coded as 1 and White coded as -1.
Prior research has shown a significant interaction where armed targets were shot faster
than unarmed targets, and this increase in speed was larger for Black targets. The hypothesized
replication of this stereotype-based shooter bias was not found in the Control condition, yielding
a non-significant Race X Gun interaction (Table 2, Model 1). This expected interaction was also
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not found in the Mostly Congruent (Table 2, Model 2) and Mostly Incongruent (Table 2, Model
3) conditions.
Accuracy. Accuracy had the same LME analysis procedure to the response time analysis.
Refer to Table 3 for accuracy descriptive statistics and Figure 3 for a graph of the accuracy
results across all three conditions. Timeouts on the 700-ms response deadline counted as an
incorrect response. These timeouts were included as errors because they were not identically
distributed across all combinations of Race and Gun indicating that they could be evidence of
stereotype bias. A separate analysis excluding timeouts is reported below. Refer to Table 4 for a
summary of the fixed effects for shooting accuracy across all three experiments.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Accuracy Across All Experiments
Experiment

Condition

Mean

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

Min Max

Baseline

Black Armed

0.84

0.37

-1.87

1.48

0

1

Black Unarmed

0.70

0.46

-0.89

-1.21

0

1

White Armed

0.80

0.39

-1.56

0.43

0

1

White Unarmed

0.71

0.45

-0.92

-1.16

0

1

Mostly

Black Armed

0.77

0.42

-1.30

-0.31

0

1

Congruent

Black Unarmed

0.65

0.48

-0.63

-1.61

0

1

White Armed

0.68

0.47

-0.77

-1.42

0

1

White Unarmed

0.72

0.45

-0.95

-1.09

0

1

Mostly

Black Armed

0.79

0.41

-1.40

-0.04

0

1

Incongruent

Black Unarmed

0.75

0.43

-1.14

-0.70

0

1

White Armed

0.82

0.38

-1.68

-0.81

0

1

White Unarmed

0.66

0.47

-0.68

-1.54

0

1

Note: Response timeouts are included in accuracy total and counted as incorrect.
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Figure 3.

Mean accuracy for the three shooter task conditions.

Note: Error bars represent standard error. MC = Mostly Congruent; MI = Mostly Incongruent.
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Table 4
LME Fixed Effects for Accuracy for the Three Experiments
Predictor

Estimate (ms)

SE

z

p

Model 1. Test for shooting bias in the Control condition
(Intercept)

1.33

.157

8.46

< .001

Gun

0.37

.071

5.21

< .001

Race

0.06

.082

0.78

.436

Antisaccade

0.25

.078

3.26

.001

Gun:Race

0.08

.066

1.19

.234

Model 2. Test for shooting bias in the Mostly Congruent condition
(Intercept)

1.08

.131

8.20

< .001

Gun

0.13

.112

1.15

.248

Race

0.05

.104

0.47

.640

Antisaccade

0.18

.078

2.28

.023

Gun:Race

0.23

.110

2.07

.039

Model 3. Test for shooting bias in the Mostly Incongruent condition
(Intercept)

1.40

.212

6.61

< .001

Gun

0.21

.134

1.56

.120

Race

0.11

.122

0.88

.377

Antisaccade

0.36

.082

4.39

< .001

Gun:Race

-0.18

.131

-1.34

.180

Gun:Race:Antisaccade

-0.15

.044

-3.33

< .001

Note: The levels of the Gun variable were Armed and Unarmed, with Armed coded as 1 and
Unarmed coded as -1. The levels of the Race variable were Black and White, with Black coded
as 1 and White coded as -1.

The expected shooting bias from previous literature was not replicated in the Control
condition, showing no significant Gun X Race interaction (Table 4, Model 1). The Mostly
Congruent condition, where participants were expected to be using more reactive control and
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elicit more racial bias, did show this interaction (Table 4, Model 2). Using simple effects to
further explore this interaction, accuracy for Black armed targets was significantly higher than
Black unarmed targets, z = -2.27, p = .024. There was no accuracy difference between armed
and unarmed White targets, z = 0.62, p = .533. In order to further investigate this increase in
racial shooting bias, a new LME model was performed that added experimental condition
(Control or Mostly Congruent) as a factor. This analysis yielded a significant Race X Gun X
Experiment three-way interaction, z = 4.01, p < .001. Simple effects showed shooting accuracy
was similar between armed and unarmed trials for White targets in the Mostly Congruent
condition, z = - 0.23, p = .816, but armed and unarmed trials were different for all other targets
and conditions (p < .05). This finding suggests that the accuracy benefits for armed White trials
in the Baseline condition was erased in the Mostly Congruent condition. This finding showed
that the Mostly Congruent condition had more racial shooting bias than the Control condition.
The Mostly Incongruent condition, where participants were expected to be using more
proactive control and elicit less racial bias, did not show a significant Gun X Race interaction
(Table 2, Model 3).
Accuracy without timeouts. Another accuracy analysis that excluded timeouts (i.e.,
timeouts do not count as an incorrect response) from the analysis was conducted in order to
determine if including timeouts in the accuracy dependent measure made the shooting bias effect
more or less pronounced. If excluding timeouts made the effect larger, then a case could be made
that response timeouts were not as indicative of racial shooting bias as an actual incorrect
response. This new analysis yielded smaller racial shooting bias effects. Refer to Figure 4 for
mean accuracy with timeouts excluded and Table 5 for a summary of the fixed effects across all
three experiments.
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Figure 4.

Mean accuracy for the three shooter task conditions.

Note: Timeouts were excluded. Error bars represent standard error. MC = Mostly Congruent; MI
= Mostly Incongruent.
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Table 5
LME Fixed Effects for Accuracy (No Timeouts) for the Three Experiments
Predictor

Estimate (ms)

SE

z

p

Model 1. Test for shooting bias in the Control condition
(Intercept)

1.33

.157

8.46

< .001

Gun

0.37

.071

5.21

< .001

Race

0.06

.082

0.78

.436

Antisaccade

0.25

.078

3.26

.001

Gun:Race

0.08

.066

1.19

.234

Model 2. Test for shooting bias in the Mostly Congruent condition
(Intercept)

1.07

.170

6.33

< .001

Gun

0.19

.097

1.92

.055

Race

0.05

.098

0.52

.601

Gun:Race

0.28

.097

2.84

.005

Model 3. Test for shooting bias in the Mostly Incongruent condition
(Intercept)

1.40

.220

6.35

< .001

Gun

0.23

.133

1.69

.090

Race

0.10

.121

0.80

.423

Antisaccade

0.32

.076

4.22

< .001

Gun:Race

-0.19

.133

-1.45

.146

Gun:Race:Antisaccade

-0.18

.041

-4.30

< .001

Note: The levels of the Gun variable were Armed and Unarmed, with Armed coded as 1 and
Unarmed coded as -1. The levels of the Race variable were Black and White, with Black coded
as 1 and White coded as -1.

There was not racial shooting bias in the Control (Table 5, Model 1) or Mostly
Incongruent (Table 5, Model 3) conditions. The Mostly Congruent condition again showed racial
shooting bias with a significant Gun X Race two-way interaction (Table 5, Model 2). Simple
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effects showed that shooting accuracy for Black armed targets was significantly higher than
shooting accuracy for Black unarmed targets, z = -3.25, p = .001. There was no accuracy
difference between armed and unarmed White targets, z = 0.68, p = .495. Comparing the Mostly
Congruent condition to the Baseline condition, a significant three-way Race X Gun X
Experiment interaction was found, z = 2.90, p = .004. Simple effects showed that the accuracy
for White targets was again equal for armed and unarmed trials, but only in the Mostly
Congruent condition, z = -3.79, p < .001.
Similar to the analysis that included timeouts, the Mostly Incongruent condition did not
show a significant Gun X Race interaction (Table 5, Model 3).
Signal detection measures: d-prime and criterion. The linear mixed effects (LME)
model used to model d’ and c had target race and the three working memory measures as fixed
effects. The working memory measures were not allowed to interact with each other. The
stimulus background and participant were random effects. Refer to Table 6 and Table 7 for
descriptive statistics of d’ and c. See Table 8 and Table 9 for a summary of the fixed effects form
the LME models for d’ and c, respectively.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for d’ Dependent Measure Across All Experiments
Experiment
Baseline

Mostly Congruent

Mostly Incongruent

Condition

Mean

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

Min

Max

Black

2.22

0.75

-0.25

-0.10

0.30

3.77

White

2.05

0.66

-0.17

-0.76

0.74

3.46

Black

1.84

0.82

-0.83

0.60

-0.42

3.27

White

1.64

0.81

-0.10

-0.76

-0.09

3.28

Black

2.18

0.68

-0.43

-0.48

0.49

3.39

White

1.85

0.62

-0.44

-0.42

0.34

2.99

Note: All signal detection measures were calculated using the “psycho” version 0.3.4 library in
R.

Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for c Dependent Measure Across All Experiments
Experiment
Baseline

Mostly Congruent

Mostly Incongruent

Condition

Mean

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

Min

Max

Black

1.11

0.63

1.96

4.83

0.33

3.87

White

1.16

0.85

4.94

8.89

0.31

5.25

Black

1.25

0.74

1.72

2.75

0.31

3.86

White

1.54

0.88

1.75

2.45

0.59

4.32

Black

1.88

1.26

1.01

-0.25

0.47

5.23

White

0.95

0.53

2.43

2.43

0.35

3.26

Note: All signal detection measures were calculated using the “psycho” version 0.3.4 library in
R.
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Table 8
LME Fixed Effects for D-prime (d’) in the Three FPST Experiments
Predictor

Estimate (ms)

SE

t

p

Model 1. Test for object discriminability in the Control condition
(Intercept)

2.05

0.08

24.26

< .001

Race

0.09

0.03

2.85

.006

Antisaccade

0.21

0.09

2.31

.024

Model 2. Test for object discriminability in the Mostly Congruent condition
(Intercept)

1.78

.087

20.33

< .001

Race

0.08

.045

1.82

.073

Model 3. Test for object discriminability in the Mostly Incongruent condition
(Intercept)

2.09

.065

32.11

< .001

Race

0.14

.034

4.19

< .001

Antisaccade

0.24

.065

3.61

< .001

Note: The levels of the Race variable were Black and White, with Black coded as 1 and White
coded as -1.
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Table 9
LME Fixed Effects for Criterion (c) in the Three FPST Experiments
Predictor

Estimate (ms)

SE

t

p

Model 1. Test for shooting threshold in the Control condition
(Intercept)

-0.04

.021

-1.72

.091

Race

-0.00

.018

-0.13

.896

Model 2. Test for shooting threshold in the Mostly Congruent condition
(Intercept)

0.08

.024

3.58

< .001

Race

-0.07

.018

-3.96

< .001

Antisaccade

-0.04

.024

-1.50

.138

Race:Antisaccade

-0.04

.018

-2.12

.038

Model 3. Test for shooting threshold in the Mostly Incongruent condition
(Intercept)

0.05

.023

2.16

.034

Race

0.15

.022

6.97

< .001

Antisaccade

0.03

.023

1.23

.224

Race:Antisaccade

0.05

.022

2.44

.017

Note. The levels of the Race variable were Black and White, with Black coded as 1 and White
coded as -1.

Contrary to previous literature that showed equal d’ between Black and White targets,
with differences manifesting more in the c measure, Black targets had larger d’ scores than white
targets for the Control (Table 8, Model 1) and Mostly Incongruent (Table 8, Model 3)
experiments. This finding suggests that participants were better at discriminating the object being
held by a Black target when compared to a White target during unbiased and stereotype
incongruent situations.
Additionally, participants appeared to adjust their shooting threshold according to task
manipulations. See Figure 5 for a graph of the c results.
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Figure 5.

Mean criterion (c) for the three shooter conditions.

Note: Error bars represent standard error. MC = Mostly Congruent; MI = Mostly Incongruent.

There was no difference in c (the threshold to shoot) across any fixed effects in the
Control experiment (Table 9, Model 1); however, participants adjusted their shooting threshold
accordingly in the two congruency manipulations. Black targets in the Mostly Congruent
experiment (who appeared armed 80 percent of the time) were shot more liberally than White
targets (t = -3.96, p < .001). However, White targets in the Mostly Incongruent experiment (who
appeared armed 80 percent of the time) were shot more liberally than Black targets (t = 4.19, p <
.001). These findings show that aggressive shooting behavior is more dependent on the
frequency of armed trials, regardless of target race
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To summarize, the current experiment mostly replicated the shooting bias found in
previous literature: participants are generally more accurate and faster at shooting Black armed
targets when compared to White armed targets. However, an exception was found in the Mostly
Incongruent experiment where participants demonstrated an accuracy bias against White targets
(better at armed trials and worse at unarmed trials) when compared to Black targets.
Working Memory and Shooting Bias
The three components of working memory were used in the above LME models to
explore the relationship between shooting bias and the three components of working memory.
See Table 10 for descriptive statistics of the three working memory measures. Significant effects
were found for all dependent measures: response time, accuracy, d’, and c.
Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for Working Memory Measures
Working Memory Measure

Mean

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

Min

Max

Runback

100.16

18.59

0.27

-0.20

54

150

Symmetry Span

26.85

7.96

-0.49

-0.05

0

42

Antisaccade

26.23

6.03

-0.54

-0.57

10

36

Note: Numbers were calculated using raw scores of every task.

The Antisaccade (attentional control) measure was the only measure that showed
consistently reliable effects across the multiple analyses. A negative relationship between the
runback score and reaction time (Table 2, Model 3) was the only other time a working memory
effect was found outside of the Antisaccade measure.
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There were no Race X Gun X WM Measure interactions in any of the three shooter
manipulations for response time, failing to support the hypothesis that higher working memory
should be associated with lower shooting bias (Table 2). Higher Antisaccade scores were
associated with faster overall response times for both the Mostly Congruent (Table 2, Model 2)
and Mostly Incongruent (Table 2, Model 3) conditions. This finding shows that shooting
decisions can become faster as attentional control increases.
Accuracy, on the other hand, did show that attentional control is associated with lower
shooting bias. Showing that high attentional control is important when making correct shooting
responses, higher Antisaccade scores were associated with higher shooting accuracy across all
conditions (Table 4). Providing support to the hypothesis that higher working memory
(specifically, the attentional control component) would be associated with the reduction of
shooting bias, the Mostly Incongruent condition yielded a significant three-way Race X Gun X
Antisaccade interaction, z = -3.33, p < .001. See Figure 6 (MI panel) for a graph of this
interaction.
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Figure 6.

Race X Gun X Antisaccade relationship.

Note: Only the Mostly Incongruent (MI) condition had a significant interaction. Anstisaccade
scores are standardized.

Simple effects showed that there was no difference in accuracy between Black armed and
Black unarmed accuracy when Antisaccade was high, z = 1.11, p = .266. However, White armed
accuracy was significantly higher than White unarmed accuracy when Antisaccade was high, z =
-2.40, p = .017. This finding suggests that high attentional control was associated with a reversal
of the typical shooting bias found in previous literature, resulting in more biased shooting
behavior against White targets. This interaction also shows that accuracy scores increase as
Antisaccade scores increase, and the rate of increase is significantly higher for unarmed Black
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targets. This finding suggests that attentional control was especially important for making correct
shooting decisions in the unarmed Black condition.
Providing evidence to support the idea that the three components of working memory
could be differentially related to shooting bias, scores on the Symmetry Span (secondary
memory access) and Runback (primary memory capacity) did not show any significant
relationship to shooting accuracy. Only Antisaccade scores, hypothesized to be a measure of the
attentional control component of working memory, showed a relationship with shooting bias.
The two signal detection measures (d’ and c) also showed relationship to working
memory (attentional control component). For example, higher Antisaccade scores were
associated with higher object discriminability (d’) for the Control (t = 2.31, p = .024) and Mostly
Incongruent (t = 3.61, p < .001) experiments. See Figure 7 for a graph of the relationship
between Antisaccade and d-prime for all three shooter conditions. These findings suggest that
higher attentional control increases object discriminability in the FPST.

63

Figure 7.

Relation between Antisaccade scores and d’.

Note: Figure depicting relation between Antisaccade scores and d’. Antisaccade scores are
standardized.

Finally, showing support to the hypotheses that higher working memory and proactive
control should lower shooting bias, a significant two-way Race X Antisaccade interaction was
found for c (the threshold at which a shooting decision is made) in the Mostly Incongruent
condition, t = 2.44, p = .017. See Figure 8 for a graph of the relationship between Antisaccade
and shooting threshold.
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Figure 8.

Relationship between Antisaccade and shooting threshold.

Note: Only the Mostly Incongruent (MI) condition had a significant interaction. Antisaccade
scores are standardized.

Simple effects showed that for the Mostly Incongruent condition, a condition
hypothesized to elicit more proactive control, having high attentional control was associated with
a higher shooting threshold for Black targets, t = -2.56, p = .011. This relationship was not found
for White targets, t = 0.78, p = .438. This increase in conservative shooting behavior for Black
targets should be expected given that most Black targets in the Mostly Incongruent condition
were unarmed. Critically, only people with high attentional control could make this adjustment.
A significant Race X Antisaccade interaction was also found in the Mostly Congruent
condition, t = -2.12, p = .038. Simple effects again showed that high attentional control was
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associated with correctly adjusting to task proportions. Participants became more liberal in their
shooting behavior for Black targets as attentional control increased, t = 2.47, p = .015. This
effect was not found for White targets, t = -0.07, p = .944. Overall, shooting criterion appeared
to be more associated to attentional control for Black targets when compared to White targets.
Conclusion
Overall, Study 1 showed some supporting evidence of the shooter bias found in the
literature. It should be noted that this study is the first to incorporate mixed effects models in
analysis of the FPST. Using models without random effects related to the items results in
replication of many of the existing results in the literature. Further examination of the items used
in the FPST is warranted but beyond the scope of this dissertation.
In terms of the three-component model of working memory, the attentional control
component appeared to be the most related to shooting behavior. This relationship is especially
evident in the Mostly Incongruent condition where proactive control, an attentional control
strategy that is highly dependent on working memory, should have been most preferred. The
other components, primary memory capacity and access to secondary memory were not related
to performance in the FPST. An important thing to note, however, is that Study 1 only used one
task for the attentional control and secondary memory access components and two tasks for the
capacity component.
Although some supporting evidence was found for the hypotheses, further work is needed
to get a better understanding on how individual differences play a role in shooting bias. Given
that no experimental task is task pure, it is often recommended that multiple tasks are used in
order to get a measure of a given construct (Little et al., 1999). With this in mind, the Study 2
only focused on the attentional control component of working memory, using multiple tasks to
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measure the construct. This more thorough measure of attentional control allowed for better
interpretations of the nature of the relationship between attentional control and shooting bias.
The same multi-task approach was also used for the measure of proactive/reactive control.
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY 2: PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE CONTROL
There are two main questions in Study 2. First, is proactive/reactive control different
from attentional control ability? In other words, are there individual differences in the strategy to
use attentional control that are independent from the capacity for attentional control? Second,
how does proactive/reactive control and attentional control relate to shooting bias in the FPST?
This chapter addresses the first question and the following chapter addresses the second question.
Understanding Proactive and Reactive Control
With respect to the first main research question, two hypotheses were tested. First, it was
hypothesized that proactive/reactive control would be a stable construct encompassing multiple
tasks, showing evidence that it is a measurable individual difference. Second, it was also
hypothesized that proactive control would be more strongly related to attentional control than
reactive control.
A set of three tasks was used to create a measure of attentional control: Antisaccade task,
Stroop task, and Flanker task. An additional set of three tasks was used for the proactive/reactive
control components. These tasks were the AX-CPT task, a modified Stroop task using the
methods of Bugg (2017), and a cued-task switching paradigm (Savine et al., 2010). Every task
allowed for a reactive control and a proactive control score. The scores on these tasks measured
how often a person used proactive control when compared to reactive control (propensity
measure). Another type of score that measured how well a person could employ proactive and
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reactive control (ability measure) was investigated as a supplementary analysis in Appendix A.
There were fundamental problems in estimating the ability latent variables, and therefore they
will not be discussed further.
Method
Participants
The participants were 314 Mississippi State University undergraduates. Like Study 1, the
sample was restricted to people between the ages of 18 and 35 who self-identified as White.
Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and participated for course credit. There
were 225 participants included in the factor analyses. This drop off in sample size was due to
three factors: (1) technical errors that resulted in computer crashes or incomplete data (n = 54);
(2) initially timeslots scheduled for the study were only 2 hours leading to many early
participants not finishing (n = 28); and (3) participants withdrawing from the study (n = 7).
Design
All participants performed the six tasks that were used to measure the attentional control
and proactive/reactive control measures. These six tasks were performed in the same order for
every participant.
Attentional Control Measures of Working Memory
The Antisaccade task, Flanker task, and Stroop task were used for the attentional control
component. The Antisaccade and Flanker tasks were selected from the attentional control
component found in the confirmatory factor analysis of Unsworth (2016). The Stroop task was
selected due to its well-known implications in attentional control ability and its usefulness in
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allowing for the measurement of a proactive/reactive control measure (Bugg, 2014; Unsworth &
Spillers, 2010).
Antisaccade task. The current study used the same Antisaccade task trial procedure
found in Study 1.
Stroop task. A modified Stroop task was adapted from Bugg (2014). The task used eight
color words divided into two separate sets. The first set was RED, BLUE, WHITE, and
PURPLE; the second set was PINK, GREEN, BLACK, and YELLOW. The sets did not overlap.
For example, the word RED (from set 1) never appeared in green (from set 2) font color.
Participants responded by pressing the computer keyboard key that corresponded with the first
letter of the font color. For example, if the word was presented in green font color, the participant
was to press the “g” key. Note that the BLUE and BLACK words are in different sets and
therefore did not overlap (e.g., BLUE in black font color both leading to a “b” response). Words
were either congruent (word and font color match) or incongruent (word and font color do not
match).
The Stroop task procedure began with a practice block of 10 trials (5 congruent). A trial
began with a 250-ms fixation cross at the center of the screen. After the fixation cross, a colorword appeared in the center of the screen. The word was visible until the participant made a
response. Feedback (i.e., “Correct” or “Incorrect”) was given for 1500 ms after each response in
the practice block. All stimuli were presented in 24-point Arial font presented on a light gray
background. The experimental trials followed the same procedure of the practice trials, however
there was no feedback. Instead, a blank screen for 300 ms was displayed. There were 96
experimental trials (48 congruent). The magnitude of the Stroop effect (mean incongruent
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response time - mean congruent response time) was used as a measure of attentional control.
Smaller differences represented more control.
Flanker task. The Flanker task was adapted from Heitz and Engle (2007). The task
required participants to respond to a target letter presented in the center of the screen. The target
letter was either an “S” or an “H.” Trials in this task were either “compatible” or “incompatible.”
Compatible trials had the target letter flanked by two of the same letters on both sides (i.e.,
“SSSSS” or “HHHHH”). Incompatible trials had targets flanked by the opposite letter (i.e.,
“HHSHH” or “SSHSS”). A Flanker trial began with a 500 ms blank screen followed by a
fixation cross presented in the middle of the screen for a random time interval of 500 -1000 ms.
After that fixation cross, the Flanker stimuli appeared in the center of the screen until a response
was made or a response deadline of 600 ms was reached. Participants were instructed to respond
as quickly as possible by pressing the “s” key with their left index finger for the S target or the
“h” key with their right index finger the H target.
The Flanker task procedure began with 10 practice trials (5 compatible) that included
feedback to the participant. The practice block was followed by 100 experimental trials (evenly
split between compatible and incompatible) that did not include feedback. The difference in
accuracy between the compatible and incompatible trials was used as a measure of attention
control. Smaller differences represented more control.
Reactive and Proactive Control
Reactive/proactive propensity and ability measures were calculated for the AXContinuous Performance Task, Cued Task Switching Task, and Modified Stroop task. The
propensity measure represented the ratio of proactive control versus reactive control strategy
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choices a participant made. The ability measure represented how effective participants were at
using the attentional control strategies.
AX-continuous performance task (AX-CPT). The AX-CPT task (Rosvold, Mirsky, &
Sarason, 1956) required participants to respond to cue-probe pairs of presented letters.
Participants pressed the “yes” button any time the “A” cue was followed by the “X” probe (AX
trials). Participants responded “no” to all other cue-probe pairs. There were also BX, AY, and
BY trials in task, with each trial type making up 10% of the total trials. The BX trials had the
correct “X” probe, however the probe followed an incorrect cue (any letter other than “A”). The
AY trials had the correct “A” cue, however the probe (any letter other than “X”) was incorrect.
BY trials had both an incorrect cue and probe. Participants were required to make a response to
every letter they saw. For every letter presentation, they were instructed to press the “.” key
except when the letter “X” followed the letter “A.” For those trials, participants pressed the “/”
button. All probes and cues were presented in red Arial font (.1 norm in height) in the center of a
black screen.
The AX-CPT task had the following procedure. Participants first viewed a demo
sequence of six trials that had feedback after every cue-probe presentation. The feedback
explained what key should have been pressed after each stimulus letter presentation (e.g., “The
correct responses were “.” to the “A” and “/” to the “X”). The demo had three AX trials, and one
trial of AY, BX, and BY, respectively. A demo trial had the following sequence. First, the cue
was displayed for 300 ms. Next, a blank screen appeared for 4.9 s. The probe then followed bank
screen for 300 ms. Then, an inter-trial interval screen displaying “***” appeared for 1 s. Finally,
participants received the feedback for that trial. The feedback remained on the screen until the
participant pressed space bar to move on to the next trial.
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After the demos, participants saw 10 practice trials. The AX trials made up 7 of these
trials; the other three conditions each had one trial. A practice trial began with a 300-ms cue
presentation. Participants had 1300 ms to respond to the cue. A 4.9 s blank screen followed the
response. The probe then appeared for 300 ms. Participants had 1300 ms from the onset of the
probe to make a response. Participants had to score above 80% accuracy on both the cue and the
probe in order to move on the next block of the experiment. If they failed to reach this criterion,
they were told their accuracy on both the cue and probe and instructed to try again to get a higher
score. Once participants met the accuracy criterion for this practice set, they moved on to the
experimental trials.
There were 120 experimental trials in the task presented evenly across four blocks.
Within each block, there were 21 AX trials, 3 AY trials, 3, BX trials, and 3 BY trials. Accuracy
and response times were collected for all responses. Response times on the AY trials were used
as a measure of proactive control ability and were expected to be slower as proactive control
increased. This response trend was expected because seeing the “A” cue (which is frequently
followed by the X probe) should cause proactive people to anticipate the appearance of an “X”,
making the correct “yes” response slower than the people who did not anticipate the “X.”
Response times on the BX trials were used as a measure of reactive control ability and were
expected to be faster as reactive control ability increased. This trend was expected because
reactive people will not use the “B” cue in order to prepare for the upcoming “no” response.
Thus, there should be a general slowdown on BX trials because the cue will have to be
reactivated in order to make the correct response. Higher reactive ability people should be able to
reactive that cue faster. Response times for the BY trials were expected to be similar between
proactive and reactive strategies. The difference between AY response time and BY response
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time (AY-BY) was used as a measure of proactive/reactive propensity. This measure was used
because a proactive strategy should yield slower response time than a reactive strategy for AY
trials (because using a proactive strategy will cause you to expect an “X” after the “A” cue).
However, BY trials should elicit similar response times between the two strategies. Subtracting
the two conditions should result in larger numbers representing higher use of proactive control.
Response times, instead of accuracy, were used for the AX-CPT task measures because they are
more variable and show higher task reliability than accuracy (Cooper et al., 2017).
Modified Stroop task. The same stimuli from the aforementioned Stroop task were used
for the modified Stroop task. The modified task manipulated item-specific congruency for each
word. Mostly Incongruent words were presented in an incongruent form 75% of the time.
Unbiased words were presented in incongruent form 50% of the time. List-wide, items in a word
set were presented in either mostly incongruent ratio or an unbiased ratio, counterbalanced
among participants. Overall, the task had 288 trials, with 192 trials (67%) being incongruent and
96 (33% being congruent). Each of the four mostly incongruent words were presented 48 times
(36 congruent; 12 incongruent). The unbiased words were each presented 24 times (12
congruent; 12 incongruent). See Table 11 for a complete overview of the stimulus presentation.
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Table 11
Frequency of Stroop Stimuli
Control Manipulation
Item Type

Congruent

Incongruent

Red

Unbiased

6

6

Blue

Unbiased

6

6

White

Unbiased

6

6

Purple

Unbiased

6

6

Pink

Unbiased

6

6

Green

Unbiased

6

6

Black

Unbiased

6

6

Yellow

Unbiased

6

6

48

48

Total Trials

Proportion Manipulation
Item Type

Congruent

Incongruent

Red

Mostly Incongruent

12

36

Blue

Mostly Incongruent

12

36

White

Mostly Incongruent

12

36

Purple

Mostly Incongruent

12

36

Pink

Unbiased

12

12

Green

Unbiased

12

12

Black

Unbiased

12

12

Yellow

Unbiased

12

12

96

192

Total Trials

Note: Unbiased and Mostly Incongruent items were counter-balanced between subjects.

The trials were distributed evenly across four blocks separated by a brief rest period.
This task occurred immediately following the Stroop task earlier described and followed the
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same trial procedure. The Stroop effect of the Mostly Incongruent items were used as a measure
of reactive control ability, with smaller effects representing higher ability. The Stroop effect of
the unbiased items presented within the proportion manipulation was used as a measure of
proactive control ability, with smaller effects representing high ability. The measure of proactive
control propensity was calculated by subtracting the Stroop effect found in the mostly
incongruent condition from the Stroop effect found in the baseline Stroop condition. It was
expected that people with high proactive control propensity would show a small difference
between these effects because they would be more likely to use the same strategy (proactive
control) in both conditions. Therefore, lower scores indicated high proactive control propensity.
Cued Task Switching task. The Cued Task Switching task (adapted from Bugg and
Braver, 2016) required participants to respond to a letter-number pair (e.g., “1A”). Participants
performed one of two tasks during any given trial: (1) identified if the letter was a consonant or
vowel; or (2) identified if the number was even or odd. There were 16 different stimuli: 1A, A1,
2A, A2, 1B, B1, 2B, B2, 3E, E3, 4E, E4, 3D, D3, 4D, and D4. The letter was on the left for half
of the trials and on the right for the other half of the trials. There were two consonants, two
vowels, two odd numbers, and two even numbers. Participants used the “A” key with their left
index finger and the “L” key with their right index finger to make responses. An example key
response mapping could be the “A” key is pressed whenever a participant needs to respond
“vowel” or “even” and the “L” key is pressed whenever a participant needs to respond
“consonant” or “odd.” Four possible response mappings for each key were counterbalanced
across participants: (1) consonant or even, (2) consonant or odd, (3) vowel or even, and (4)
vowel or odd. The letter-number pairs were designed such that half the pairs would always have
incongruent response mappings within a trial while the other half would be congruent. For
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example, if the “S” key represented “vowel” or “even” and the “L” key represented “consonant”
or “odd”, an example of an incongruent stimulus would be “A3”. An example of a congruent
stimulus would be “E4.”
The cued-task-switching task procedure was as followed. Participants were told that a
letter and a number would appear on the screen for each trial, and that prior to this presentation
there would be instructions to either read “attend letter” or “attend number.” These instructions
indicated which element of the letter-number pair they needed to use in order to make a
response. Participants then performed eight practice trials where corrective feedback (reminder
of task rules) was given on incorrect responses. The 8 trials were distributed evenly among the
four possible “left key - right key”, “congruent- incongruent” combinations.
A trial in these blocks had the following procedure. Participants first saw a 300-ms
fixation cross presented in the center of the screen. The task cue, either “ATTEND LETTER” or
“ATTEND NUMBER”, was then presented for 500 ms. The letter task cue was presented in blue
font color and the number task cue was presented in red font color. The task cue was followed by
a 900- ms blank screen that served as the cue-target interval. This cue-target interval allowed
participants to engage in preparatory attentional biasing for the upcoming trial. The 900-ms
presentation time was used because it provides enough time to employ proactive control (Meiran
& Kessler, 2008), but not too much time such that participants perform at ceiling (i.e., Bugg and
Braver, 2016). The target following the letter number then appeared until a response is made.
Trials were separated by a 1000-ms blank screen.
There were 192 experimental trials split into 4 different blocks. The first two baseline
blocks did not involve task switching and presented 32 unmixed trials each (i.e., 32 “attend
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letter” trials or 32 “attend number” trials). These blocks were half congruent and half
incongruent. The order of these two blocks was counterbalanced across participants.
The third block presented 64 trials; half the trials were “attend letter” and the other half
were “attend number.” These 64 trials were split evenly into congruent and incongruent trial
types. Mixing the trial types within this block was expected to make participants more reliant on
the pre-target cue for preparatory attentional biasing, eliciting more proactive control when
compared to the baseline blocks. Thus, people with high proactive control engagement should
show smaller response time increases than people with low proactive control engagement.
The fourth block presented 64 mixed trials (half letter; half congruent) with one
modification to the trial procedure. The fourth block did not have a task cue presented before the
stimulus. Instead, the stimulus was presented in either blue or red font color. Participants
responded to the letter of the stimulus if the font color was blue and responded to the number of
the stimulus if the font color was red. Because participants could only activate attentional control
until after stimulus presentation, this manipulation forced a more reactive control strategy when
compared to other blocks.
The proactive control propensity measure was calculated by subtracting mean response
time of the proactive block from the mean response time of the reactive block. Higher numbers
represented more proactive propensity. This is because a high (positive) difference would show
that participants suffered less switch cost in the proactive block when compared to the reactive
block. Mean response time for the proactive block was used as a measure proactive ability; mean
response times for the reactive block was used to represent reactive ability. Smaller numbers
meant smaller switch costs and represented higher ability for both measures.
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Demographic Survey
The demographic survey asked participants to identify their age, college classification
(i.e., Freshman, Sophomore, etc.), ethnicity, and race.
Procedure
The experiment began with participants giving their informed consent and reading a brief
set of instructions about the upcoming tasks. Participants then performed the practice block of
the FPST. Following the practice shooter block, performed the three FPST experimental blocks
dispersed among the attentional control tasks. The order in which the FPST blocks were
presented was counterbalanced across participants. The order of these tasks were as followed: (1)
shooter task training, (2) Antisaccade task, (3) Cued Task Switching task, (4) FPST block, (5)
Stroop task, (6) FPST block , (7) Flanker task, (8) AX-CPT task, (9) FPST block, (10)
demographic survey.
Analysis Procedure
Confirmatory factor analyses were performed using the attentional control and
proactive/reactive propensity measures. Three different sets of factor models were examined.
The models were developed using suggested practices of structural equation modeling (Bollen &
Long, 1992). The steps to making a model are as followed: (1) specification, (2) identification,
(3) estimation, (4) testing, and (5, optionally) respecification. Model specification can be
accomplished based on a theoretical hypothesis or previous research. The current model builds
on the work of Unsworth (2016) and Braver (2012), who outlined the role of attention in both
working memory and control strategies, as the basis of model specification. Identification refers
to the ability to obtain measures that represent the different components in the model. The fact
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that the current model is leveraging off of past research on working memory shows that it is
possible to obtain measurements for the attentional control component and meet the requirement
of identification. The ability to do the same with the proactive/reactive measures is an open
question that is addressed in one of the study’s main hypotheses. Estimation and testing refers to
the attempt to explain variance within some dependent variable using the model’s components.
The current study accomplished this by comparing three hypothesized models of cognitive
control using confirmatory factor analysis.
Model fit indices Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) were used to compare these three nested models (Akaike, 1974; Schwartz, 1978). Lower
values are considered better than higher values for these fit indices (McDonald & Ho, 2002).
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) was used as an index of absolute fit. This
measure represents how well the observed model fits to a theoretical optimal model (McDonald
& Ho, 2002). Scores below .05 indicate excellent fit, between .05 and .10 indicate fair fit, and
scores above .10 indicate poor fit (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). Because the same
tasks were used to obtain the proactive and reactive measures, error variance among indicators
were not correlated. Correlating all of these error variances would have had every indicator from
one factor correlated to every other indicator in another factor and lessen the ability to interpret
the model fits (Hermida, 2015).
Factor analyses were conducted in R using the lavaan 0.6-5 package. There were three
attentional control measures: Antisaccade accuracy, Flanker task accuracy, and Stroop effect
response time. There were three proactive/reactive propensity measures: Stroop propensity, Cued
Task Switching propensity, and AX-CPT propensity. All variables were transformed to be
positively valenced. Higher scores represented more attentional control for the attentional control
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measures; higher propensity scores represented a higher likelihood to use proactive control
versus reactive control. Additionally, variables were rescaled such that no variable had a
variance that was more than three times larger than any other variable (Kline, 2015).
Results
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Model Set 1
Model Set 1 factor analyses included six measures: Antisaccade, Flanker, Baseline
Stroop, AXCPT propensity, Cued Task Switching propensity, and Stroop propensity. The
propensity measures were scaled such that higher numbers represented a higher propensity to use
proactive control when compared to reactive control. A propensity score of 0 represented equal
usage of proactive and reactive control. See Table 12 for all model statistics, Table 13 for
descriptive statistics, and Table 14 for the correlations of the new measures.
Table 12
Model Fit Statistics for Model Sets 1 and 2
Set
Set 1
Set 2

Model Df
1A

8

1B

NA

2A
2B

AIC

BIC

CFI

-1831.30 -1786.89 .912
NA

NA

RMSEA
.075

NA

NA

4

-1538.28 -1500.70 1.00

.000

5

-1533.41 -1499.24 .820

.069

Note: Models are listed from most complex to most parsimonious within each model set. Model
in bold indicates the model selected as the overall best fit model and was used in subsequent
shooter task analyses.
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Table 13
Descriptive Statistics for Model Set 1 Indicators
Task

Mean SD

Skew Kurtosis Min

Max

ANT

23.90 6.30 -0.24

-0.87

9.00

36.00

FLK

0.02

0.02 -0.39

-0.02

-0.03

0.07

STR

0.27

0.13

0.14

4.23

-0.49

0.81

CTS(Pr)

0.68

0.66

0.01

9.08

-3.01

4.75

STR(Pr)

0.05

0.18 -0.33

11.51

-0.90

1.22

AX(Pr)

0.16

0.12 -0.61

3.56

-0.47

0.59

Note: Abbreviations: STR = Stroop, AX = AXCPT, CTS = Cued Task Switching.

Table 14
Pearson’s Correlations for All Tasks
Task

ANT FLK STR CTS(Pr) STR(Pr) AX(Pr)

ANT

1

FLK

.09

1

STR

.27

.08

1

CTS(Pr)

.07

-.01

.00

1

STR(Pr)

.08

.02

-.52

-.08

1

AX(Pr)

.08

-.07

-.07

.15

.11

1

Note: ANT = Antisaccade, FLK = Flanker task, STR = Baseline Stroop, AX = AXCPT, CTS =
Cued Task Switching, “Pr” represents proactive propensity.

Model 1A (Figure 19) had two factors. The first factor was an Attentional Control factor
that included the Antisaccade, Flanker, and Baseline Stroop measures. The Propensity factor had
the three proactive propensity measures. The factors were allowed to covary. The model showed
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fair absolute fit (RMSEA = .075). See Table 12 for model statistics. Despite showing acceptable
RMSEA, Model 1A had two indicators with negative error variance (AXCPT and Stroop
propensity), indicating a critically flawed model.

Figure 9.

Graph of Model 1A.

Note: Abbreviations: CTSProp = Cued Task Switching, Proactive Propensity, AXCTProp =
AXCPT Proactive Propensity, ProacProp = Proactive Propensity. All factor loadings are
standardized. StroopProp = Stroop Proactive Propensity. All factor loadings are standardized. * =
p < .05.

Model 1B used the same indicators as Model 1A but consolidated the two factors into
one Attentional Control component. This model did not converge. Fit measures and factor
loadings were not calculated.
Upon further examination of Model 1A, it was suspected that the proactive propensity
measure for the Stroop task was the reason the Model Set 1 analyses were failing. The Stroop
proactive propensity measure was at a disadvantage when compared to the propensity measures
83

of the AX-CPT and Cued Task Switching tasks. This disadvantage is present because the AXCPT task was specifically designed to dissociate proactive and reactive control. Similarly, the
Cued Task Switching task has a condition that can only be accomplished using reactive control,
making dissociation easier in comparison to its proactive condition. The Stroop task, however,
more heavily relied on performance in the baseline condition (a condition that is already
represented as the Baseline Stroop indicator) to calculate the proactive propensity measure. Not
surprisingly, the Stroop propensity measure showed negative error variance as an indicator in the
two-factor model (Model 1A). Additionally, it was one of only two indicators (the other was
Baseline Stroop) that did not account for additional variance beyond the model’s latent variables.
Finally, the Stroop propensity measure correlated with the other two propensity measures in
different directions, indicating that common variance among the three tasks cannot be extracted.
To fix these problems, the Stroop propensity measure was dropped for Model Set 2.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Model Set 2
Model 2A (Figure 10) had the same two factors as Model 2B, with the exclusion of the
Stroop propensity measure. Refer to Table 12 for all Model 2A statistics. The model showed
excellent absolute fit, RMSEA = .000. The two components did not significantly covary, z
=1.686, p =.092. This result suggests that the propensity to use proactive control and attentional
control ability are two separate constructs.
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Figure 10.

Graph of Model 2A.

Note: Abbreviations: CTSProp = Cued Task Switching Proactive Propensity, AXCTProp =
AXCPT Proactive Propensity, ProacProp = Proactive Propensity. All factor loadings are
standardized. * = p < .05.

Model 2B consolidated the two factors from Model 2A into one single factor. See Table
12 for all model statistics. Model 2B had a fair absolute fit (RMSEA = .069). In comparison to
Model 2A, this result provides supporting evidence that proactive propensity and attentional
control are separate. Additionally, both AIC and BIC were worse for Model 2B when compared
to Model 2A, providing further evidence in support for the two-factor model. See Figure 11 for a
graph of Model 2B. Taken all together, Model 2A is the best representation of the current study’s
measures and provides supporting evidence to the idea that attentional control ability and
proactive control strategy use are separate constructs.
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Figure 11.

Graph of Model 2B.

Note: Abbreviations: AXCTProp = AXCPT Proactive Propensity, ProacProp = Proactive
Propensity. All factor loadings are standardized. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01.

Discussion
Study 2 attempted to examine whether proactive/reactive control was different from
attentional control and explore how those processes related to shooting bias in the FPST. It was
first hypothesized that proactive/reactive control strategy use was a stable measure across
multiple tasks so that it was a measurable individual difference.
Two sets of factor analyses were used to (1) test how stable proactive and reactive control
are across multiple tasks and (2) test the relationship between proactive/reactive control and
attentional control. The best-fitting model in Model Set 1 had proactive/reactive control separate
from attentional control. This finding suggested that proactive/reactive control was separate from
attentional control. Upon further examination of Model Set 1, the proactive/reactive measure
obtained from the Stroop task was dropped due to collinearity issues, resulting in Model Set 2.
Results of Model Set 2 were similar to Model Set 1. Separating proactive propensity from
attentional control yielded a better fit to the data than when combining both constructs into one
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factor. Additionally, this two-factor model showed the best fit out of all models tested. This
finding shows that the best fit to the data has proactive control as a separate construct from
attentional control ability. Also, both proactive propensity indicators showed moderate positive
relationships to the propensity factor, providing supporting evidence that proactive/reactive
control is a stable construct across tasks.
Additionally, there was no relationship between the propensity factor and the attentional
control factor. This lack of a relationship is not in line with previous research that show a
positive relationship between working memory and proactive control (Weimers and Redick,
2018; Richmond et al., 2016). The reason for this discrepancy could be due to the types of
working memory measures used in previous research when compared to Study 2. For example,
Weimers et al. (2018) and Richmond et al. (2016) used complex memory span tasks (Operation
Span and Symmetry Span) for their measures of working memory. In terms of the threecomponent theory of working memory (Unsworth, 2016), complex memory span tasks are best
represented as measures of the secondary memory access component of working memory. In
contrast, Study 2 used measures that are best represented as the attentional control component of
working memory. Thus, the current study provides evidence that suggests the attentional control
component may have a different relationship to proactive/reactive control than the other working
memory components.
The extent in which these relationships are independent is, however, an open question.
For example, Maraver et al. (2016) showed that performing complex memory span tasks or
“inhibition control” tasks (similar to the current study’s attentional control tasks) made
participants more likely to use proactive control in a subsequent AX-CPT task when compared to
performing a processing speed task before the AX-CPT. Although that study did not explicitly
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measure the specific correlation between the span tasks’ performance, it did show that the
secondary memory access and attentional control components of working memory are similarly
related to the likelihood of using proactive control. In short, despite the current study finding no
explicit relationship between the attentional control and proactive control component, the two
processes that these components represent have been shown to be related. Although further
research is needed to better understand this relationship, results of the factor analyses provides
evidence to suggest that attentional control and proactive propensity are stable constructs that
can be may be able to be used to predict behavior in other tasks.
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CHAPTER V
FIRST PERSON SHOOTER TASK
Upon finding evidence that favored the two-factor model that included attentional control
and proactive control propensity as the two latent variables, the factor loadings from those two
latent variables were used as a predictor in LME analyses that modeled shooter task
performance. Additionally, parameters calculated from drift diffusion modeling were used to
better understand shooting decisions.
The Diffusion Model
The diffusion model describes a way in which information is accumulated during a twochoice discrimination process (Ratcliff, 1976; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). The model has four
parameters. See Figure 12 for a depiction of these parameters.
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Figure 12.

Drift-diffusion model.

Note: Depiction of the diffusion model’s parameters. Z represents the starting point at which
information accumulation starts. It is halfway between both responses, demonstrating no bias
towards one decision over the other. A represents the upper threshold of the amount of
information needed in order to select the “Shoot” response; 0 represents the lower threshold of
information needed for the “Don’t Shoot” response. The blue line represents a relatively high
information accumulation rate (drift rate); the red line represents a relatively low drift rate. Time
is represented from left to right, so the lower drift rate shown by the red line results in a longer
response time.

The starting point parameter is the beginning of the information accumulation process.
During this step, information is collected from the environment until a desired response threshold
is met (e.g., responding to a detected stimulus). The response thresholds represent the amount of
information that is required for making a decision (each response has its own threshold). The rate
at which information is accumulated, resulting in the model moving from the starting point to the
threshold, is the drift rate.
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The model also has noise so that the rate of information accumulation randomly differs
from one decision to the next. The diffusion model is used to describe accuracy and response
time distributions for various processes such as memory retrieval, perceptual identification, and
two-alternative decision making (Ratcliff, 1976; Voss et al., 2004). Generally, response time and
accuracy improve as drift rates increase. Shifting the starting point closer to a response threshold
may also improve accuracy and response time. The parameters of the diffusion model have been
empirically validated by various studies (Voss et al., 2004; VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001; Purcell
et al., 2010). Empirical validation was accomplished by successfully predicting specific
components of the decision process by manipulating the parameters of the diffusion model.
For example, Voss et al. (2004) used a color discrimination task that had specific
manipulations theorized to affect the parameters of the model. The color discrimination task
presented participants with a two-color image (orange and blue) on a desktop computer. The
normal condition presented an array with a blue-orange ratio of 53:47. The difficult condition
presented an array with a blue-orange ratio of 51.5:48.5. The participants’ task was to determine
which color dominated the image. The difference in the orange-blue ratio between the normal
and difficult condition was hypothesized to affect rate of information accumulation (drift rate).
The difficult condition was meant to be harder to discriminate, and it was hypothesized that its
drift rate would be low. Results showing smaller drift rates for the difficult condition confirmed
this hypothesis.
Additionally, a high accuracy condition was used that allowed participants more time to
respond and encouraged more accurate discriminations. This accuracy manipulation was used to
affect the response thresholds of the task (upper and lower threshold parameter). The high
accuracy condition was hypothesized to make the response threshold between the two competing
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responses farther apart, resulting in more accurate decisions. Results showing higher threshold
separation for the high accuracy condition confirmed this hypothesis. Additionally, a response
handicap condition was used that only allowed one finger to be used to make both “orange” and
“blue” responses. This handicap was used to affect how long it took to make a response
(response time constant). It was hypothesized that the response handicap condition would
increase the response time constant parameter. Results showing an increase in the response time
constant for the handicap condition confirmed this hypothesis. An important thing to note about
the model is that it assumed that participants were not biased towards one color over the other (a
starting point that was equally distant between the blue and orange response thresholds). An
additional experiment that manipulated payoff that promoted one response over the other,
resulting in a starting point that shifted towards the more promoted response, confirmed this
assumption. Participants showed a higher drift rate and were more liberal in giving the promoted
response when compared to the non-promoted response. The ability to predict specific
components of the decision process by manipulating the parameters of the diffusion model was a
successful test of the model’s validity.
Modeling the FPST as a Diffusion Process
The faster response times found for FPST trials that are in line with stereotypic beliefs
(i.e., “Black Armed” and “White Unarmed” trials) could be explained by the diffusion model’s
parameters. Because stereotype information automatically facilitates the processing of any
concepts related to that stereotype (Dovidio et al., 1997), the speed up in response time found for
these trials could be seen as a result of an increase in drift rate. Because stereotype incongruent
trials (i.e., Black Unarmed and White Armed) do not benefit from this facilitation, those trials
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should have a lower drift rate relative to the stereotype congruent trials. This lower drift would
result in slower response times when compared to stereotype congruent trials.
In addition to behavioral evidence, neural evidence for the information accumulation
parameter of the diffusion model has been found (Purcell et al., 2010). The researchers identified
the information accumulation process by measuring neural discharges of frontal eye field (FEF)
neurons in the macaque monkey performing a perceptual decision-making task. The monkeys
had to make a saccade to a color singleton presented amongst distractors in either an easy (green
targets amongst red distractors) or hard (green targets amongst yellow-green distractors)
condition. A motion task was also used that required monkeys to make a saccade to an easy (100
percent of targets move in a different direction than distractors) or a hard (50-60 percent of
targets move in a different direction than the distractors) moving condition. Neuron activity
showed a similar response for target and distractor items during the onset of stimulus
presentation. However, over time, the response for distractor items decreased and the response
for target stimuli increased. Movement neuron activity continued to increase until a threshold
was reached and a saccade was made to the target. Results showed a slower divergence in
neuronal activity for hard searches when compared to easy searches. In the context of the
diffusion model, this slower divergence can be seen as a decrease in drift rate for harder
searches. This trend is precisely what would be predicted by the diffusion model. In a later
experiment, Purcell et al. (2012) showed that saccades cannot be made until visual information
rises above threshold in visual neurons, and the speed at which this occurs depends on the
salience of low-level information such as color and shape. These findings are in agreement to the
drift rate manipulations of Voss et al. (2004) that found decreased drift rates as the stimulus
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discrimination task got harder. Taken together, these results show neurophysiological evidence
for the diffusion model’s drift rate parameter that is associated with information accumulation.
VanRullen and Thorpe (2001) found similar evidence validating the drift rate parameter
using event-related potentials (ERPs). Correlating ERP data and behavioral responses,
VanRullen and Thorpe (2001) showed evidence for a two-process system of visual
categorization. The first process evaluates low-level visual information in a manner analogous to
the information accumulator models (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). The second process evaluates
high-level task-related information and is independent of the first process. Using a visual
categorization task, results showed that categorization could be made above chance level after
only 250 ms. Additionally, ERPs did not start to diverge between target and distractor until 7580 ms after stimulus onset, with statistically significant divergence occurring at 160 ms. This
finding was interpreted as the neural indicator of the switch from a general low-level perceptual
process to a more specific task-related process. Results also showed evidence for the existence of
an information accumulator that processes information until a decision threshold is reached. This
process can provide valuable information about how the FPST is performed. For example, shoot
decisions that depend on high-level information such as racial bias may not be a possibility if
they are made within 250 ms of stimulus onset. In summary, the success of the diffusion model’s
parameter validation suggests that, after performing analogous manipulations in the shooter task,
confident predictions can be made about shooting decisions.
For example, Correll et al. (2015) used the drift rate and response time parameters to
model behavior on the FPST. In terms of the diffusion model, a separate starting point estimate
was used for Black and White targets. Drift rate and non-decision time estimates varied across all
conditions. Results showed a higher drift rate for armed Black targets when compared to armed
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White targets, and a higher drift rate for unarmed White targets when compared to unarmed
Black targets. The interpretation of this result is that the racial bias found in the FPST research
could be due to an increase in the rate of information accumulation for the objects being held
during stereotypic situations.
The rate of information accumulation may not be the only factor influencing the shooter
bias in the Correll et al. (2015) experiment. Further analyses suggested that stereotypic situations
actually augment the incoming visual information. In addition to the diffusion model analysis,
the researchers used the distance between the fovea’s focus and the gun/tool (the only visual
information needed to make a response) in the stimuli to calculate a measure of information
accumulation. They reasoned that participants had a more detailed representation of the object
the closer the fovea was to the object. Results showed that the mean distance between foveal
focus and object was significantly larger for stereotype congruent conditions (e.g., armed Black
targets and unarmed White targets) when compared to stereotype incongruent conditions. Thus,
responses to stimuli that confirmed a bias were made with less information about the object
being held. It was suspected that visual search was terminated early in the stereotype congruent
trials because the incoming object information was being augmented to fit the participants’
expectancy. A follow-up study confirmed this suspicion by eliminating the short reaction time
window of the first experiments and allowed participants unlimited time on each trial. The
reasoning being that, if given enough time, participants should resolve any response-competition
interference and respond to what they truly interpreted the object to be. Nevertheless,
participants still showed the same stereotypic bias. In summary, racial bias can have a large
effect on not only how fast information is accumulated but also how that information is
interpreted. Although the diffusion model parameters are useful in providing a framework for
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making hypotheses about shooting decisions in FPST, there are other factors outside its scope
that should also be considered when examining decision making behavior in the task. For
example, people could use different attention strategies to accumulate information in the FPST,
resulting in differential behavioral patterns that could affect the shooting bias. For example,
consider the relatively fast response times found for stereotype congruent trials and the relatively
slow response times typically found for stereotype incongruent trials. If these response times are
the result of a difference in drift rate for object information between the two trial types (Correll
et al. (2015), attentional strategies that attenuate racial identity information should yield smaller
differences in drift rate between the trial types. Consequently, these attentional strategies should
slow down (decrease the drift rate) stereotype congruent responses and speed up (increase the
drift rate) stereotype incongruent responses.
Examining the FPST
Drift diffusion modeling coupled with the factors extracted from the factor analyses were
used to address the second research question of Study 2: what is the relationship among racial
shooting bias, proactive/reactive control, and attentional control? Two hypotheses were tested in
relation to this question. First, it was hypothesized that increased proactive control would result
in a decrease in racial shooting bias. This decrease in shooting bias should result in decreased
shooting accuracy differences between armed and unarmed targets, a shift in starting point away
from stereotype congruent responses, and decrease in drift rate for the stereotype congruent
responses. Second, high attentional control was hypothesized to be negatively associated with
shooting bias. Similar interactions with accuracy, starting point, and drift rate were expected for
attentional control.
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A FPST that included baseline (control), mostly congruent (reactive control shift), and
mostly incongruent (proactive control shift) conditions was administered in order to test these
relationships. If using proactive/reactive control in one task is predictive of using it in another
task, a person who is high in proactive control should show better performance on the proactiveencouraged version of the FPST than a primarily reactive person (and vice versa for a primarily
reactive person). In terms of attentional control, people with high attention control should have
high performance on proactive-encouraged FPST. In order to better understand how these
processes have an effect on decisions in the FPST, drift diffusion modeling was used (Ratcliff,
1976; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008).
Method
Participants
Utilizing the sample of participants from the factor analysis, an additional 13 participants
were excluded due to being an outlier on the shooting task. Outlier criteria were as followed: (1)
responding “shoot” on more than 80% of total trials, (2) responding “ don’t shoot” on more than
80% of total trials, and/or (3) reaching the response timeout threshold on more than 33% of the
trials. This reduction resulted in a total of 203 participants in all shooter task analyses.
First-Person-Shooter Task (FPST)
The task stimuli were color target images depicting a single young male holding either a
gun or a non-gun. These set of target image contained 20 different background images of public
places (e.g., a train station, park, office lobby, etc.). Within each target image, one of 50 different
target people was presented. Target people could be either African American or White males.
Every target person was presented as armed and unarmed throughout the task. There were two
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different gun objects (a silver revolver and a black 9-mm pistol) and four non-gun objects (a
silver aluminum can, a silver camera, a black cell-phone, and a black wallet). These stimuli
combined for four conditions: Black Unarmed, Black Armed, White Unarmed, and White
Armed. Participants were instructed to “shoot” any target they saw holding a gun and “not
shoot” when they saw a person holding something other than a gun. The shoot response was the
letter “q” on the keyboard and the “don’t shoot” response was the letter “p.” All responses had to
be made within 700 ms of target presentation. Targets were always presented one at a time,
holding an object, while either standing or kneeling. The task also awarded and deducted points
for correct and incorrect responses. Participants received 10 points for every correct “shoot”
response and 5 points for every correct “don’t shoot” response. They lost 20 points for every
incorrect “shoot” response, 40 points for every incorrect “don’t shoot” response, and 10 points
for every timeout.
All trials, whether practice or experimental, followed the same procedure. A trial began
with a 1000-ms fixation cross. After the fixation cross, filler pictures of random scenes were
presented for a random number of monitor refresh cycles between 29–59 cycles (at 60hz); filler
picture duration lengths ranged from 483 to 984 ms, in intervals of roughly 17 ms. The number
of filler pictures randomly varied between one and three. After the filler pictures, the target scene
(without a target person) appeared for a random duration that was identical to the filler pictures.
After the target scene image, another image depicting the same target scene appeared with the
addition of a single target person presented within the scene. This target picture appeared on the
screen until the participant made a response or the response deadline of 700 ms was reached.
Participants receive feedback after every trial. The feedback can be “correct,” “incorrect,” or
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“too slow” depending on the participants’ response. The feedback screen also gave participants
their cumulative score.
As a modification to the original Correll et al. (2002) shooting task, the current shooter
task continued collecting key responses after the deadline had elapsed. This procedure enabled
most timeout trials to still have key response and response time data that could be included in
analyses. Decisions made after the response deadline were still scored as incorrect when
calculating shooter accuracy. However, these post-deadline decisions were included in the drift
rate analysis.
The shooter task begins with 16 practice trials, divided equally among the four Race and
Gun conditions. There were 480 experimental trials divided into 3 blocks (160 trials per block).
Experimental blocks were either be baseline (50% stereotype congruent), mostly incongruent
(80% stereotype incongruent), or mostly congruent (20% stereotype incongruent). The mostly
incongruent blocks, which presented a large number of trials that required participants to ignore
irrelevant information in order to make a correct response, was suspected to increase
participants’ use of proactive control. The mostly congruent blocks, which presented a large
number of trials that did not require participants to ignore irrelevant information, was suspected
to reduce the likelihood of proactive control usage and increase the likelihood of reactive control.
Design
The design of the FPST was a 2 (Gun: Armed or Unarmed) by 2 (Target Race: Black or
White) by 3 (Shooter Condition: Control, Mostly Congruent, or Mostly Incongruent). All factors
were within-subjects.
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FPST Analysis
Drift diffusion modeling. Diffusion model parameters were calculated using the “fastdm” program (Voss et al., 2004; Voss & Voss, 2007). All model parameters were modeled
following the methods of Correll et al. (2015). The threshold separation parameter was held
constant (a = 1) across the four Gun X Race cells. Also, only correct trials were included in the
analysis. A separate starting point was modeled between Black and White targets. Finally, drift
rate was calculated separately for all four of the Gun X Race cells.
Linear mixed effect modeling. Linear Mixed Effect (LME) modeling was used to test
the hypothesis that increased proactive control would result in a decrease in shooting bias.
Accuracy and the diffusion model’s drift rate and starting point parameters were used as
dependent measures for these analyses. These measures were selected based on previous findings
from Study 1 and previous FPST literature (Correll et al., 2015; Mekawi & Bresin, 2015) that
showed these measures were sensitive to racial shooting bias.
The factor scores that represent attentional control and proactive/reactive propensity were
included as a fixed effect in the LME analyses. For analyses with accuracy as the dependent
measure, the possible random effects were Subject (the participants), Target Person (the
individuals used in the stimuli), and Target Scene (the background environments in which targets
were presented). The Subject and Target Scene random effects allowed for random slopes for
both Gun and Race. Additionally, random slopes for Shooter Condition were allowed for
Subject. The Target Person random effect allowed for random slopes for Race. The random
effects structure was selected by beginning with the maximal model and eliminating random
effect terms that did not account for significant variance until a parsimonious random effects
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structure was found (Matuschek et al., 2017).When drift rate and starting point were the
dependent measures, Subject was the only random effect.
All fixed effects were allowed to interact. If needed, simple effects analyses were used to
further examine significant interactions. These simple effects analyses were done using the
“emmeans” (v1.4.1) package. For continuous variables, the mean difference between the levels
of the interacting variable was compared between “low” (-1.5 SD) and “high” (1.5 SD) points.
For example, a significant Race X Attentional Control interaction would be further examined by
comparing the difference between Black and White with Attentional Control 1.5 standard
deviations above and below the mean. Similar to Study 1, non-significant higher-order
interactions were reduced in order to interpret lower-order interactions.
Results
Shooting Accuracy
For shooting accuracy, Race (Black or White), Gun (Armed or Unarmed), Shooter
Condition (Baseline, Mostly Congruent, Mostly Incongruent), Attentional Control, and Proactive
Control Propensity were fixed effects. All Shooter Condition comparisons were made relative to
the Baseline condition. To test the hypothesis that high attentional control would be negatively
associated with shooting bias, the Gun X Race X Attentional Control factor interaction was
examined within the LME analyses. Participants with high attentional control were expected to
show lower Gun X Race interaction effects than participants with low attentional control. The
hypothesis that proactive control would be negatively associated with shooting bias was tested in
two ways. The first way of testing the hypothesis was examining the Gun X Race X Proactive
Propensity interaction. The second way of testing was examining shooting bias in the Mostly
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Incongruent condition (a condition that encourages proactive control) in comparison to the
Baseline condition. Refer to Figure 13 for a summary of the shooting accuracy results.

Figure 13.

Mean accuracy for the three shooter conditions.

Note: Error bars represent standard error. Even = Baseline condition, MC = Mostly Congruent
condition, MI = Mostly Incongruent condition.

Finding evidence contrary to the hypothesis that proactive control would decrease
shooting bias, a significant Race X Gun X Shooter Condition interaction was found in the Mostly
Incongruent (proactive-encouraged) condition, z = 2.44, p = .015. See Table 15 for accuracy
model statistics.
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Table 15
LME Fixed Effects for Shooting Accuracy
Predictor

Estimate

B

(Accuracy)
(Intercept)

1.29

Gun

0.13

Race

z

p

95 % CI

95 % CI

Low

High

9.65

<.001

.295

1.08

.278

-.238

.827

0.10

.216

0.72

.469

-.370

.803

Attentional Control

0.39

.720

6.30

<.001

.496

.945

Proac

0.10

.128

1.12

.261

-.095

.351

0.08

.083

0.97

.332

-.084

.250

-0.28

-.300

-3.02

.002

-.495

-.106

Gun X Race

0.02

.052

0.23

.815

-.383

.487

Race X Proac

-0.07

-.083

-2.60

.009

-.146

-.021

0.24

.317

3.82

<.001

.155

.480

0.38

.505

4.33

<.001

.276

.734

-0.07

-.089

-0.95

.341

-.271

.094

0.06

.079

0.71

.479

-.140

.299

-0.11

-.114

-2.07

.040

-.223

-.006

-0.10

-.113

-2.23

.026

-.212

-.013

Shooter Condition
(MC - Baseline)
Shooter Condition
(MI - Baseline)

Gun X Shooter Condition
(MC - Baseline)
Gun X Shooter Condition
(MI - Baseline)
Race X Shooter Condition
(MC - Baseline)
Race X Shooter Condition
(MI - Baseline)
Attentional Control X Shooter
Condition (MC - Baseline)
Attentional Control X Shooter
Condition (MI - Baseline)
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Table 15 (Continued)
Predictor

Estimate

B

(Accuracy)
Proac X Shooter Condition
(MC - Baseline)
Proac X Shooter Condition
(MI - Baseline)
Gun X Race X Shooter
Condition (MC - Baseline)
Gun X Race X Shooter
Condition (MI - Baseline)
Race X Proac X Shooter
Condition (MC - Baseline)
Race X Proac X Shooter
Condition (MI - Baseline)

z

p

95 % CI

95 % CI

Low

High

-0.01

-.011

-0.20

.845

-.117

.096

-0.03

-.023

-0.46

.643

-.120

.074

0.00

.003

0.03

.976

-.189

.195

-0.32

-.395

-3.28

.001

-.631

-.159

0.02

.013

0.46

.644

-.041

.066

0.09

.065

2.44

.015

.013

.117

Note: The levels of the Gun variable were Armed and Unarmed, with Armed coded as 1 and
Unarmed coded as -1. The levels of the Race variable were Black and White, with Black coded
as 1 and White coded as -1. The Mostly Incongruent and Mostly Congruent levels of Shooter
Condition were always compared to the Baseline condition. AC = Attentional Control, Proac =
Proactive Proportion, MC = Mostly Congruent, MI = Mostly Incongruent. Random effect
structure: (1) random intercept of Subject, with random slopes for Gun and Shooter Condition
(2) random intercept of Target Person with a random slope for Gun (3) random intercept of
Target Scene, with a random slope for Gun and Race

When comparing the Mostly Incongruent condition to Baseline, this interaction showed a
reversal of the typical shooting bias, resulting in more biased shooting behavior for White
targets. Simple effect analyses showed there was a large difference in accuracy between armed
and unarmed trials for White targets in the Mostly Incongruent condition, z = -4.93, p = .001.
This effect was not as large for Black targets, z = -1.08, p = .001. See Figure 17 for a graph of
this interaction. Examining racial shooting bias in the Mostly Congruent condition when
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compared to Baseline, a non-significant Race X Gun X Shooter Condition three-way interaction
was found, z = .031, p = .332.
Failing to find supporting evidence for the hypothesis that attentional control would be
negatively related to shooting bias, there was no significant Race X Gun X Attentional Control
interaction in any of the three shooter conditions. Despite the three-way interaction being nonsignificant, there were significant lower-order interactions between in the Mostly Congruent and
Mostly Incongruent conditions. A significant Attentional Control X Shooter Condition two-way
interaction was found for the Mostly Congruent condition, z = -2.07, p = .039 and the Mostly
Incongruent condition, z = -2.23, p =.026. Both interactions showed that the positive relationship
between shooting accuracy and Attentional Control was higher in the Baseline condition when
compared to the other conditions. See Figure 14 for a graph of these interactions.

Figure 14.

Attentional control across shooting conditions.

Note: Graph showing relationship between shooter accuracy and the Attentional Control latent
variable. Even = Baseline condition, MC = Mostly Congruent condition, MI = Mostly
Incongruent condition.
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Failing to support the hypothesis that proactive control would decrease shooting bias, the
Gun X Race X Proactive Propensity interaction was not significant for any shooter condition.
However, there were significant lower-ordered interactions that showed a relationship between
proactive propensity and shooting accuracy. A significant Race X Proactive Propensity X
Shooter Condition three-way interaction was found for the Mostly Incongruent condition, z =
2.436, p = .015. Unexpectedly, simple effect analyses showed that high proactive propensity was
more associated with accuracy in the Baseline condition than the Mostly Incongruent condition,
but only for White targets, z = 3.518, p = .001. The relationship between proactive propensity
and shooting accuracy remained the same between conditions for Black targets, z = .738, p =
.741. See Figure 15 for a graph of the relationship between Proactive Propensity and shooting
accuracy.
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Figure 15.

Race X Proactive Propensity X Shooter Condition interactions.

Note: Only the Mostly Incongruent condition was significantly different from Baseline. Graph is
a plot of model fit.

Drift Rate
A drift rate bias measure was calculated for Black and White targets using diffusion
model data using “fast-dm” (Voss et al., 2004). Diffusion model data included all correct
responses regardless if they were made after the 700 ms response threshold. Incorrect responses
were not included in the dataset. This is different from the accuracy data reported above that
counted responses past the deadline as incorrect. This change allowed for more trials per
condition in the analysis, as diffusion model estimates become more reliable as the number of
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observations increases. Despite allowing for responses past the deadline, the majority of
decisions were made within the 700 ms response deadline (M = 579 ms; SD = 11 ms). See Figure
16 for a histogram of all shooting response times and Figure 17 for mean accuracies. Eleven
percent of all response times were made after 700 ms.

Figure 16.

Response time distribution for diffusion model analysis dataset.

Note: Dotted blue line represents the 700 ms response deadline. Eleven percent of responses
were made past this deadline.
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Figure 17.

Accuracy for diffusion model analysis dataset.

Note: Error bars represent standard error. Even = Baseline condition, MC = Mostly Congruent
condition, MI = Mostly Incongruent condition.

Study 2’s drift rate measure was calculated by subtracting the absolute value of the
unarmed drift rate from the absolute value of the armed drift rate for both Black and White
targets. Positive drift rates represented faster evidence accumulation for guns. Negative scores
represented faster evidence accumulation for neutral objects. Notably, stereotype bias would
show up as higher drift rates for Black targets (tendency to shoot faster) and lower drift rates for
White targets (tendency to choose not to shoot faster). Using this difference measure instead of
the raw scores reduced the number of terms in the model and allowed for easier interpretation of
interactions. The drift rate analysis had Race (Black or White), Shooter Condition (Baseline,
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Mostly Congruent, Mostly Incongruent), Attentional Control, and Proactive Control Propensity
as fixed effects. Because the drift rate measure cannot be measured on a per trial basis, the
random effect structure of the drift rate analysis was simpler than the accuracy model (See Table
16 notes for effect structure). All Shooter Condition comparisons were made relative to the
Baseline condition. Refer to Figure 18 for a summary of drift bias results.

Figure 18.

Graph of mean drift bias.

Note: Error bars represent standard error. Even = Baseline condition, MC = Mostly Congruent
condition, MI = Mostly Incongruent condition.

Three-way interactions were used to test the hypothesized relationships among shooting
bias, attentional control, and proactive propensity. Non-significant Race X Shooter Condition X
Attentional Control three-way interactions for Mostly Incongruent and Mostly Congruent
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comparisons to Baseline failed to provide evidence for the hypothesis that having high
attentional control would lead to less shooting bias. See Table 16 for all drift rate effects.
Table 16
LME Fixed Effects for Drift Rate
Predictor

Estimate
(ms)

(Intercept)

.457

Race

.062

B

z

p

95 %

95 %

CI Low

CI High

6.940

<.001

.049

.943

.346

-.053

.150

.214

.079

2.234

.003

.010

.148

.131

.048

1.223

.222

-.029

.124

AC

-.024

-.015

-.287

.774

-.121

.090

Proac

-.078

-.034

-.614

.539

-.142

.074

-.137

-.061

-1.424

.155

-.146

.023

-.212

-.093

-2.153

.032

-.178

-.008

.149

.095

1.769

.077

-.010

.201

.081

.030

.653

.514

-.059

.118

.078

.027

.573

.567

-.066

.121

-.051

-.022

-.399

.690

-.130

.086

.259

.065

1.380

.168

-.028

.158

.199

.046

.968

.334

-.047

.138

-.116

-.047

-1.009

.313

-.138

.044

Shooter Condition
(MC - Baseline)
Shooter Condition
(MI - Baseline)

Race X Shooter Condition
(MC - Baseline)
Race X Shooter Condition
(MI - Baseline)
Race X AC
AC X Shooter Condition
(MC - Baseline)
AC X Shooter Condition
(MI - Baseline)
Race X Proac
Proac X Shooter Condition
(MC - Baseline)
Proac X Shooter Condition
(MI - Baseline)
AC X Proac
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Table 16 (Continued)
Predictor

Estimate
(ms)

Race X AC X Shooter
Condition (MC - Baseline)
Race X AC X Shooter
Condition (MI - Baseline)
Race X Proac X Shooter
Condition (MC - Baseline)
Race X Proac X Shooter
Condition (MI - Baseline)
Race X AC X Proac
AC X Proac X Shooter
Condition (MC - Baseline)
AC X Proac X Shooter
Condition (MI - Baseline)
Race X AC X Proac X Shooter
Condition (MC - Baseline)
Race X AC X Proac X Shooter
Condition (MI - Baseline)

B

z

p

95 %

95 %

CI Low

CI High

-.183

-.067

-1.480

.139

-.156

.022

.043

.015

.343

.732

-.071

.101

.127

.032

.679

.497

-.061

.125

.139

.032

.738

.461

-.053

.117

.045

.019

.388

.698

-.078

.117

.200

.054

1.200

.230

-.034

.141

.190

.033

.801

.424

-.048

.115

-.008

-.002

-.050

.960

-.092

.087

.514

.093

2.418

.016

.018

.168

Note: The levels of the Race variable were Black and White, with Black coded as 1 and White
coded as -1. The Mostly Incongruent and Mostly Congruent levels of Shooter Condition were
always compared to the Baseline condition. AC = Attentional Control, Proac = Proactive
Proportion, MC = Mostly Congruent, MI = Mostly Incongruent. Random effects allowed for a
random intercept for Subject with random slopes for the three shooter conditions

Analogous non-significant Race X Shooter Condition X Proactive Propensity three-way
interactions provided evidence against the hypothesis that having high proactive control would
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decrease bias in drift rates. Significant higher-order four-way interactions, however, did show
relationships to shooting bias after allowing proactive control and attentional control to interact.
Providing partial support that high attentional control and high proactive control should
reduce bias, a significant Race X Shooter Condition X Attentional Control X Proactive
Propensity interaction was found when contrasting the Mostly Incongruent condition to the
Baseline condition, z = 2.418, p = .016. This interaction showed that there was no effect of
proactive propensity or attentional control for either race in the Baseline condition. However, a
crossover interaction was found for the Mostly Incongruent condition. Supporting the hypothesis
that high proactive control would reduce shooting bias, simple effects showed that high proactive
propensity was associated with reduced stereotype bias in drift rates, but only when attentional
control was low, t = 3.14, p = .002. However, with high attentional control, higher proactive
control was associated with more stereotype bias in drift rates, t = -3.66, p < .001. This result is
inconsistent with the hypothesis that proactive control and attentional control would reduce
stereotype bias in shooting behavior. See Figure 19 for a graph of the interacting terms of the
drift rate analysis.
There was no difference in drift rate for low attentional control and low proactive
propensity, t = -1.59, p = .112. In other words, there were different combinations of low/high
attentional control and proactive propensity that led to a reduction in biased evidence
accumulation rate. There were no attentional control or proactive propensity effects found in the
Mostly Congruent to Baseline condition contrast.
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Figure 19.

Propensity and attentional control for drift bias.

Note: Graph depicting the Race X Shooter Condition X Attentional Control X Proactive Control
interaction for drift bias. Abbreviations: AC = Attentional Control. Graph is a plot of model fit.
Even = Baseline condition, MC = Mostly Congruent condition, MI = Mostly Incongruent
condition.

Starting Point
Another parameter from the drift-diffusion model, starting point, was also analyzed. This
measure was used in an attempt to gain more clarity about the effects observed with drift rate.
For example, a shift in starting point closer to the upper threshold (gun response) could be the
explanation for the increased drift rate bias found in the Mostly Incongruent condition. A
separate starting point was modeled for Black and White targets. Starting points higher than .5
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are indicative of a response bias towards the “shoot” decision, an increase in shooting bias.
Starting points lower than .5 show a response bias towards the “don’t shoot” decision, a decrease
in shooting bias. Notably, stereotype bias would show up as higher starting points for Black
targets and lower starting points for White targets. See Figure 20 for a summary of the starting
point results.

Figure 20.

Graph of mean starting point.

Note: Error bars represent standard error. Even = Baseline Condition, MC = Mostly Congruent
condition, MI = Mostly Incongruent condition.

Providing support for the hypotheses that higher attentional control and proactive control
would be related to a decrease in biased shooting behavior, there was a significant four-way Race
X Shooter Condition X Attentional Control X Proactive Propensity interaction for the Mostly
Incongruent condition when compared to the Baseline condition, t = -2.49. p =.013. See Table
17 for all starting point model statistics.
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Table 17
LME Fixed Effects for Starting Point
Predictor

Estimate
(ms)

t

p

81.461

<.001

B

95 %
CI
Low

95 %
CI
High

(Intercept)

.426

Race

.006

.064

1.244

.214

-.037

.165

Shooter Condition (MC - Baseline)

.026

.126

3.582

<.001

.057

.195

Shooter Condition (MI - Baseline)

.008

.039

1.080

.280

-.031

.109

AC

.006

.049

.878

.380

-.060

.158

Proac

.002

.013

.223

.824

-.099

.125

-.005

-.028

-.654

.513

-.112

.056

-.007

-.039

-.918

.359

-.123

.045

-.010

-.085

-1.587

.113

-.190

.020

-.004

-.017

-.380

.704

-.106

.071

.005

.024

.555

.579

-.061

.110

.023

.132

2.408

.016

.025

.240

-.013

-.042

-.894

.371

-.135

.050

.027

.080

1.850

.065

-.005

.164

.002

.010

.211

.833

-.084

.104

.029

.139

3.087

.002

.051

.227

Race X Shooter Condition (MC Baseline)
Race X Shooter Condition
(MI - Baseline)
Race X AC
AC X Shooter Condition
(MC - Baseline)
AC X Shooter Condition
(MI - Baseline)
Race X Proac
Proac X Shooter Condition
(MC - Baseline)
Proac X Shooter Condition
(MI - Baseline)
AC X Proac
Race X AC X
Shooter Condition (MC - Baseline)
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Table 17 (Continued)
Predictor

Race X AC X
Shooter Condition (MI - Baseline)
Race X Proac X
Shooter Condition (MC - Baseline)
Race X Proac X Shooter Condition
(MI - Baseline)
Race X AC X Proac
AC X Proac X Shooter Condition
(MC - Baseline)
AC X Proac X Shooter Condition
(MI - Baseline)
Race X AC X Proac X Shooter
Condition (MC - Baseline)
Race X AC X Proac X Shooter
Condition (MI - Baseline)

Estimate
(ms)

t

p

B

95 %
CI
Low

95 %
CI
High

.000

.002

.049

.961

-.083

.088

-.033

-.108

-2.286

.022

-.200

-.015

-.038

-.114

-2.662

.008

-.199

-.030

-.001

-.007

-.147

.883

-.104

.090

-.019

-.067

-1.507

.132

-.154

.020

-.013

-.030

-.806

.421

-.104

.043

.001

.005

.118

.906

-.083

.094

-.040

-.095

-2.486

.013

-.169

-.020

Note: The levels of the Race variable were Black and White, with Black coded as 1 and White
coded as -1. The Mostly Incongruent and Mostly Congruent levels of Shooter Condition were
always compared to the Baseline condition. AC = Attentional Control, Proac = Proactive
Proportion, MC = Mostly Congruent, MI = Mostly Incongruent
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See Figure 21 for a graph of the interaction between proactive propensity and starting
point.

Figure 21.

Graph of starting point ffects.

Note. Abbreviations: AC = Attentional Control. Graph is a plot of model fit. Even = Baseline
condition, MC = Mostly Congruent condition, MI = Mostly Incongruent condition.

Providing further support to the hypotheses that high attentional control and high
proactive propensity would reduce stereotype bias in shooting behavior, simple effects showed
that high attentional control/high proactive propensity was related to starting points that went
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against stereotype bias, t = 4.11, p < .001.However, high attentional/low proactive propensity
showed starting points that were congruent with stereotype bias, t = -2.38, p = .002.
Finally, the Baseline condition showed that low attentional control (but high proactive
propensity) was also related to more stereotypical shooting behavior, t = -2.25, p = .002. This
stereotypical shooting behavior was a starting point closer to non-guns for White targets.
Discussion
The second question Study 2 examined was how proactive/reactive control and
attentional control related to shooting bias in the FPST. Formally addressing this question, it was
hypothesized that proactive control would be negatively associated with shooting bias.
Attentional control was similarly hypothesized to be negatively associated with shooting.
Once the best model of proactive and attentional control was found, the factor loadings
within that model were used to address Study 2’s central questions about the shooter task. This
approach allowed Study 2 to provide answers the central questions concerning racial shooting
bias. The Mostly Congruent condition, where most trials did not require stereotype suppression,
was expected to elicit more reactive control than the Baseline condition. The Mostly Incongruent
condition, where most trials required stereotype suppression, was expected to elicit more
proactive control. If the hypothesis that proactive control decreases bias was correct, it was
expected that racial shooting bias in the Mostly Incongruent condition would be lower than the
Baseline condition. Additionally, racial shooting bias should have been negatively related to the
proactive propensity measure. Results did not support this hypothesis.
In fact, shooting bias became more prominent in the Mostly Incongruent condition, but
only for White targets in a direction opposite that of the stereotype. White armed trials were
much more accurate than White unarmed trials in Mostly Incongruent when compared to
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Baseline. This result provides a possible answer to an open question that was raised when a
similar increase in bias for White targets in a Mostly Incongruent condition was found in Chapter
3. The previous study did not explicitly collect any measures of proactive control and relied
solely on the expectation that increasing the number of stereotype incongruent trials would elicit
more proactive control. For White targets, this manipulation results in White targets being
mostly armed. Thus, increasing the level of proactive control was confounded with increasing
the threat related to White targets in the Mostly Incongruent condition. The current study,
however, shows that this increase in shooting accuracy bias for White targets is not solely
modulated by explicit measures of proactive propensity. This lack of an effect suggests that the
bias may be the result of the task proportions rather than proactive control usage. It is also
noteworthy to point out that although presenting White targets as mostly armed makes
participants more aggressive towards White targets, presenting Black targets as mostly unarmed
does not make participants less aggressive towards Black targets.
The inclusion of evidence accumulation speed (drift rate) as a dependent measure was
meant to compliment the accuracy measure and provide some insight into the mechanism by
which shooting bias occurs. Previous research suggests that the racial shooting bias effect could
be due to an increase in the ability to process guns being held by Black targets and non-guns
being held by White targets (Correll et al., 2015). A reasonable assumption would be that
reducing bias should result in similar evidence accumulation rates between races for armed and
unarmed trials. Having high proactive propensity should result in less evidence accumulation
differences between Black and White targets. In short, showing that a decrease in racial shooting
bias is related to a decrease in drift rate bias would provide further support to the notion that
racial shooting bias is facilitated by the processing speed of stereotype-related information.
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There was a strong relationship between drift rate bias and proactive propensity in the
Mostly Incongruent condition. However, this relationship did not always result in the mitigation
of drift bias. Instead, evidence accumulation became more biased for either the stereotype
congruent items (i.e., Black Armed / White Unarmed) or the more frequent items (i.e., Black
Unarmed / White Armed), depending on attentional control. For instance, having low proactive
propensity (i.e., being more reactive) and high attentional control led to faster evidence
accumulation for Black targets holding neutral objects and White targets holding guns (in line
with task proportions). On the other hand, having both high proactive propensity and high
attentional control led to faster evidence accumulation for Black targets holding guns and White
targets holding neutral objects (in line with stereotype congruency). The reason for this
dissociation was unclear until it was examined in conjunction with the starting point measure.
The starting point analysis was used to gain more insight into the decisions to shoot.
People with no bias should show a neutral starting point that is equidistant from both the upper
threshold (“shoot” response) and lower threshold (“don’t shoot” response). A decrease in
shooting bias should be manifested as a shift in starting point towards the lower threshold (“don’t
shoot” response). Similar to the drift bias measure, the decision starting point became more
biased for either the stereotype congruent items (i.e., Black Armed / White Unarmed) or the
more frequent items (i.e., Black Unarmed / White Armed), depending on the levels of proactive
propensity and attentional control. Having high proactive propensity and high attentional control
led to a starting point closer to neutral objects for Black targets and a starting point closer to guns
for White targets (in line with task proportions). However, high proactive propensity and low
attentional control led to a starting point closer to guns for Black targets and neutral objects for
White targets (in line with stereotype congruency).
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Interpreting these drift bias effects while considering the starting point results may
provide a clearer picture as to what was happening during these shooting decisions. Effects in the
Mostly Incongruent condition show that when drift bias was high towards gun, the starting point
was closer to non-guns. Conversely, when the drift bias was high towards non-guns, the starting
point was closer to guns. In other words, participants showed an increase in evidence
accumulation for the response that was furthest away from their starting point. This relationship
is intuitive when you consider that trials had a response deadline and that the analysis only
included correct trials. The pattern of results suggests that when evidence accumulation started
farther away from the correct decision, faster evidence accumulation was needed in order to get
the correct answer within a certain deadline. This is novel insight into the nature of shooting
decisions within the first-person shooter task.
Although there were large effects of drift bias and starting point for Black and White
targets, the degree in which this effect manifests itself in the ultimate shooting outcome is still
questionable. Accuracy results in the Mostly Incongruent condition only showed a strong
deviation from Baseline accuracy for White targets; the shooting accuracies for Black targets
were virtually unchanged. There are two possible explanations for this result. One explanation is
that evidence accumulation has a different effect on shooting accuracy between Black and White
targets, and this effect is more strongly related to shooting decisions for White targets. The other
possible explanation is that evidence accumulation is not related to shooting accuracy at all and
the strong accuracy effects found for White targets are being driven by another factor not
captured by the current study. Further research is needed to resolve this question.
It is important to reiterate that the major drift rate and starting point effects are all seen in
the interaction between proactive propensity and attentional control. Collapsing across these
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variables and examining the group averages do not show any significant interactions (i.e., there
were no Gun X Race X Attentional Control or Gun X Race X Proactive Propensity interactions).
Although this finding does not conclusively demonstrate how evidence accumulation plays a role
in the ultimate decision to shoot, it does show that different strategies on the task can lead to
similar outcomes. Being highly reactive and having high attentional control yields the same type
of evidence accumulation as being highly proactive and having low attentional control: a
starting point that is closer to the racially stereotypical response. The result of having a starting
point close to the racially stereotypical response is that drift rates do not need to be as fast as the
non-racially stereotypical responses in order to reach the desired response deadline. However,
having high proactive control and high attentional control brings the starting point closer to the
promoted responses of the task proportions. This adjustment causes responses that go against
these frequent responses (the stereotype-congruent responses) to require greater rates of evidence
accumulation in order to reach deadline.
In summary, results suggest that people with high proactive propensity and high
attentional control were expecting unarmed Black targets, so responses to armed Black targets
required higher drift rates in order to meet deadline. Similarly, those same people were expecting
armed White targets, resulting in higher drift rates for unarmed White targets in order to reach
deadline. In other words, high proactive propensity/high attentional control was a special
combination that led participants to adjust their starting points farther away from racial
stereotypes. This finding provides new understanding on how stereotype bias, expectation, and
cognitive ability interact in the shooter task.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The two studies in this dissertation were designed to accomplish the following goals: (1)
to understand how reactive and proactive control can be used to mitigate shooting bias, (2) to
understand the relationship between attentional control and the ability to use proactive/reactive
control, (3) to explore the possibility of using proactive/reactive control strategy use as a
predictive individual difference measure, and (4) to examine the relationship between the
working memory, attentional control, and shooting bias.
Working Memory and Proactive/Reactive Control Implications
This dissertation provides evidence that the propensity to use proactive/reactive control is
a measurable individual difference. Additionally, supporting evidence was found for the idea that
attentional control needed for tasks such as the Antisaccade task is independent from
proactive/reactive control.
To date, the closest example of demonstrating that proactive/reactive control usage can
be predictive across tasks can be found in Doebel et al. (2017). They showed that using proactive
control in a stimulus tracking paradigm was predictive of using proactive control on wellestablished tasks of proactive control such as the task-switching and AX-CPT tasks. Similarly,
this dissertation found that people who had higher proactive control usage on task switching and
AX-CPT tasks also showed less racially biased shooting behavior in the proactive-encouraged
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FPST condition. Shooting behavior became less biased due to an adjustment of decision starting
point, suggesting a pre-stimulus adjustment to expectation that is indicative of proactive control.
A novel finding with future implications is the fact that proactive and reactive control are
related to the attentional control in different ways. Indeed, previous research has found
significant relationships between proactive/reactive control and other cognitive phenomena.
However, this dissertation shows that the extent to which proactive control can affect another
variable is dependent on other factors. For example, the decision-making process in the shooter
task had completely different characteristics depending on a person’s level of attentional control
and proactive control propensity.
This dissertation also provides support to the notion that, to a certain extent, people
could use proactive control if the task demands were high enough (Doebel et al., 2017; Chevalier
et al., 2015). Higher proactive propensity was more related to overall shooting accuracy in the
Baseline shooter condition than the Mostly Incongruent condition. This finding makes sense
because the Baseline condition was a neutral condition where neither proactive control nor
reactive control was favored. Therefore, a person’s propensity to use proactive control was
predictive of accuracy. Proactive people chose proactive control (the better strategy for
accuracy); reactive people chose reactive control. The Mostly Incongruent condition, on the
other hand, biased everyone to become more proactive, meaning there was less of an effect of
proactive propensity. Any future research that observes diminished performance in proactive
conditions should practice caution in interpreting their result as being a sign of low proactive
ability. Depending on the circumstances, the result could just as well be a sign of low proactive
propensity. It may not be that some participants cannot use proactive control, it is just they chose
not to use proactive control. Of course, even the probability of choosing to use proactive control
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is itself an individual difference that has been shown to be related to working memory (Wiemers
& Redick, 2018; Gonthier, Braver, & Bugg, 2016). Either way, this dissertation suggests the
distinction between ability and propensity is important.
Working Memory, Attention, and Shooting Behavior Implications
This dissertation also makes novel contributions to the racial shooting bias literature.
The first contribution is the dissociation among the three working memory components and
racial shooting bias. The closest analogues in the literature are: (1) the link between shooting
behavior and working memory without considering race (Brewer et al., 2016); and (2) the link
among racial shooting bias, working memory capacity, and executive functioning (Ito et al.,
2015). This dissertation further expanded on these findings by testing all three working memory
components and their relationship to racial shooting bias. Results show that the attentional
control component of working memory is more related to shooting bias than the capacity and
secondary memory access components.
This dissertation also provides the first demonstration of the effects of list-wide reactive
and proactive proportion effects on racial shooting bias in the FPST (although see Amodio &
Swencionis, 2018 for a similar example using the Weapons Identification Task). Presenting
stimuli that are mostly congruent to racial stereotype, and presumably shifting people to use
reactive control, had little effect on racial shooting bias. However, presenting stimuli that are
mostly incongruent to racial stereotype showed a large effect on racial shooting bias. This bias
was surprisingly increased for White targets and erased for Black targets. In other words, having
Black targets disproportionately associated with danger did not result in large increases in Black
shooting bias, but having White targets disproportionately associated with danger did increase
White shooting bias. Results showed that an interaction between attentional control and
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proactive propensity was a possible cause for this dissociation. No such links were found in the
reactive shooting conditions, suggesting that making decisions that are congruent with stereotype
require less attentional control.
Conclusion
This dissertation provides evidence that proactive control and reactive control are
separate constructs from the attentional control. Furthermore, evidence has been provided that
shows the propensity to use proactive versus reactive strategies is separate from attentional
control ability. In terms of racial shooting bias, it is clear that both proactive propensity and
attentional control have an effect on how information is processed within the shooter task,
especially in situations that require high proactive control. Only individuals high in attentional
control ability and proactive propensity were able to shift the starting point against the
stereotype. This result means that not only is high attentional control required to override a
stereotype bias, but one also has to use an appropriate control strategy to utilize this ability.
Although more research is needed, this dissertation showed a clear relationship between
proactive control, attentional control, and racial shooting bias that may have implications on how
to reduce racial bias in critical decision-making settings.
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APPENDIX A
CFA ABILITY MODELS
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The Ability Model Set included four separate models (see Figure 22 for an illustration of
models). Ability Model 1 (AM 1) had three separate components. The first component was an
attentional control component that consisted of the Stroop, Antisaccade, and Flanker tasks. The
second component was a reactive control component that consisted of the reactive measure
obtained from the AX-CPT, Cued Task Switching, and modified Stroop tasks. The third
component was a proactive control component that consisted of the proactive measure obtained
from the AX-CPT, Cued Task Switching, and modified Stroop tasks.
The latent variables were allowed to covary. This model tested the idea that attentional
control, reactive control, and proactive control are three separate constructs that shared some
common variance.
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Figure 22.

The four models for the ability model set.

Note: Abbreviations: CTS = Cued Task Switching, AC = Attentional Control, Proac = Proactive
Propensity, Reac = Reactive Control.
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The proactive control measures were all similarly correlated to each other, providing
initial support to the hypothesis the proactive control would be a stable measure across multiple
tasks. The reactive control measures, however, were not as correlated to each other. In fact, the
reactive control measures were often more correlated to their proactive control counterparts from
the task (e.g., the reactive Stroop measure was more correlated to the proactive Stroop measure
than it was to the reactive Cued Task Switching and AX-CPT measures). See Table 18 for
descriptive statistics of tasks, Table 19 for task correlations, and Table 20 for model statistics.
Table 18
Descriptive Statistics for Model Set 1 Indicators
Task

Mean

SD

Skew Kurtosis Min

Max

ANT

23.90 6.30 -0.24

-0.87

9.00 36.00

FLK

0.02

0.02 -0.39

-0.02

-0.03

0.07

STR

0.27

0.13

0.14

4.23

-0.49

0.81

CTS(P)

1.27

0.48

2.03

9.18

0.28

4.61

STR(P)

0.23

0.15

1.33

5.78

-0.41

0.96

AX(P)

0.65

0.11

0.22

0.11

0.32

0.95

CTS(R)

1.95

0.70

1.31

6.57

0.27

6.54

STR(R)

0.20

0.18

0.20

15.96

-1.11

1.23

AX(R)

0.45

0.12

1.46

2.50

0.28

0.98

Note: Abbreviations: ANT = Antisaccade, FLK = Flanker task, STR = Baseline Stroop, AX =
AXCPT, CTS = Cued Task Switching, “P” and “R” represent proactive and reactive,
respectively.
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Table 19
Pearson’s Correlations for All Tasks
Task

ANT FLK STR CTS(P) STR(P) AX(P) CTS(R) STR(R) AX(R)

ANT

1

FLK

.09

1

STR

.27

.08

1

CTS(P)

-.27

.00

-.23

1

STR(P)

-.34

-.09

-.31

-.23

1

AX(P)

-.26

-.16

-.23

.19

.19

1

CTS(R)

-.12

-.01

-.15

.55

.18

.22

1

STR(R)

-.14

-.10

-.31

.17

.29

.13

.04

1

AX(R)

-.28

-.15

-.13

.25

.11

.52

.15

.02

1

Note: Pearson’s R correlations of the nine individual difference tasks. ANT = Antisaccade, FLK
= Flanker task, STR = Baseline Stroop, AX = AXCPT, CTS = Cued Task Switching, “P” and
“R” represent proactive and reactive, respectively.

Table 20
Model Fit Statistics for Model Set 1
Set

Model Df

AIC

BIC

CFI

RMSEA

Set 1

AM 1 NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

AM 2

26

-2511.18 -2447.23 .446

.173

AM 3

26

-2562.89 -2498.93 .618

.144

AM 4

27

-2564.39 -2503.81 .620

.141

Note: Models are listed from most complex to most parsimonious within each model set. Model
in bold indicates the model selected as the overall best fit model and was used in subsequent
shooter task analyses
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Ability Model 1 did not converge, suggesting that attentional control, proactive control,
and reactive control are not three separate constructs. Due to the model failing to converge, fit
measures and factor loadings were not calculated. Thus, the hypothesis that proactive control and
reactive control would have differential relationships to the attentional control component of
working memory was not able to be tested with this model.
Ability Model 2 (AM 2) reduced the number of components by combining the attentional
control and proactive control components from AM 1 into a single component. This component
consolidation was done based on the idea that proactive control is simply choosing to use
attentional control. Specifically, proactive control may just be attentional control in the context
of task goal maintenance. The second component of AM 2 was the same reactive control
component used in AM 1. The two components were allowed to covary. See Figure 23 for a
graph of AM 2 results.

Figure 23.

Ability Model 2 factor analysis.

Note: Abbreviations: CTS = Cued Task Switching, AC = Attentional Control, Proac = Proactive
Propensity, Reac = Reactive Control. All factor loadings are standardized. *** = p < .001.
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Refer to Table 20 for a summary of all AM 2 statistics. Although the model converged,
many indicators showed negative error variance. Given that it is impossible for an indicator to
account for negative variance, this result is a sign that the model is fundamentally flawed and
should not be accepted as a valid representation of the data (Kolenikov & Bollen, 2012).
Additionally, the model showed poor absolute fit (RMSEA = .173). The covariance between the
two factors did not show a significant relationship, z =-.014, p =.989. These results suggest that
proactive control is not simply a subset of attentional control.
Ability Model 3 (AM 3) combined reactive control and proactive control components
together and had attentional control as a separate component. This model was performed to
investigate whether or not the assumption made in AM 2 (that proactive control is a subset of
attentional control) was valid. AM 3 represented the idea that proactive control and reactive
control are better represented as the same construct, a construct that is separate from attentional
control. The two components were allowed to covary. See Figure 24 for AM 3 results.

Figure 24.

Graph of Ability Model 3.

Note: Abbreviations: CTS = Cued Task Switching, AC = Attentional Control, Proac = Proactive
Propensity, Reac = Reactive Control. All factor loadings are standardized. * = p < .05. *** = p <
.001.
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Ability Model 3 converged without any error. This model showed poor absolute fit
(RMSEA = .144), but AIC and BIC measures showed that it had better comparative fit than
Model 1B. The covariance between the two factors showed a significant negative relationship, z
=-8.86, p =.001. When comparison to Ability Model 2, the results of Ability Model 3 suggest
that proactive and reactive control should not be separated from each other.
Ability Model 4 (AM 4) further reduced the model structure, resulting in a single
“attentional control” component with all nine tasks as indicators (Figure 25). This model tested
the idea that all indicators measured the same latent construct.

Figure 25.

Graph of Ability Model 4.

Note: Abbreviations: CTS = Cued Task Switching, AC = Attentional Control, Proac = Proactive
Propensity, Reac = Reactive Control. All factor loadings are standardized. * = p < .05. *** = p <
.001.

Refer to Table 20 for a summary of all Ability Model 4 statistics. Ability Model 4 also
converged without any error. Similar to Ability Model 2 and Ability Model 3, however, the onefactor model showed poor absolute fit (RMSEA = .141). However, Ability Model 4 did show the
best fit with the AIC and BIC measures (See Table 20). Having Ability Model 4 outperform the
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other models suggests that proactive control, reactive control, and attentional control are all
measuring the same underlying construct. However, the poor absolute fit of Ability Model 4
suggests that this may not be the case. Nevertheless, an examination of the three reactive
indicators and three proactive indicators in Ability Model 4 show that they are all negatively
related to attentional control. This finding provides evidence against the hypothesis that
proactive control would be differentially related to attentional control. Overall, the three models
all failed to represent the data sufficiently.
One reason for the models’ poor performance could be due to the fact the proactive and
reactive measures come from the same task. The consequences of having the same task generate
measures for both reactive and proactive control ability is that the correlations within a task is
higher than the correlations within a construct. For example, the reactive Stroop ability measure
was more correlated with the proactive Stroop ability measure than it was to the reactive cuedtask switching or AX-CPT ability measure. Future attempts to examine whether proactive and
reactive control tap separate control abilities should include measures that come from different
tasks in order to avoid these problems.
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